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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis presents an efficient set of methods to improve security on service 
availability and information privacy in a computer network environment with a focus 
on two important issues: the detection of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks 
and the anonymity of web access. The proposed methods for DDoS attack detection 
allow service providers in cyber-space to strengthen and protect their valuable online 
service from numerous DDoS attacks. For web access anonymity, the proposed 
methods allow web service providers to achieve perfect anonymity of web access to 
protect the personally identifiable information of legitimate users. Unique methods 
with several sets of mathematical models are proposed in this thesis to enhance both 
DDoS attack detection and web access anonymity. A number of publicly available 
datasets were implemented in our experiments to evaluate the performance of these 
methods. The results show a significant improvement in terms of detection 
performance and level of anonymity. 
 
DDoS attack detection is a key component in a DDoS defence system. Our detection 
methods allow for detection of DDoS attacks plus the ability to discriminate attacks 
from legitimate traffic flows in particular flash crowds (FCs). We measure the 
different levels of similarity, dependency and predictability among DDoS attacks and 
FCs. With nominated thresholds, our detection methods discriminate suspicious traffic 
flows and improve security of availability for online services. 
 
Packet padding strategy is a key approach to achieving perfect anonymity of web 
access. Web access anonymity allows legitimate users to protect their privacy 
information and remain anonymous to a third party. In this thesis, we propose pre-
fetched web objects as cover traffic instead of the commonly used dummy packet 
padding strategy in order to improve the level of anonymity. We formally establish 
several mathematical models for satisfying the requirements of this solution. As a 
result of our experiment, the proposed strategy can reduce a significant amount of 
delay and cost compared to the dummy packet padding strategy. 
 
Finally, we summarise the methodology, the contribution of this thesis, and discuss 
future work. We point out the conflict between the deployment of traffic analysis for 
DDoS attack detection and the requirement of a high level of anonymity for web 
access. We believe this study provides an original solution to the compromises of 
these two contradictory topics and leads to the achievement of high security among 
service availability and increased information privacy. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Rationale 
Service availability and information privacy are key requirements of information 
security in network communications. For a service provider, service availability is the 
ability of an online service (e.g. Internet service, email service, or website) to perform 
its required function at a stated instant or over a stated period of time. Among those 
services, users have the right to protect their confidential information (e.g. customers’ 
details, financial information, or new product plan) that may fall into the hands of 
third party such as a competitor or intruder. Failure to provide service availability and 
data privacy could result in serious consequences such as asset loss. Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and traffic analysis attacks are among the major 
threats to service availability and information privacy. 
DDoS attacks are classified as a very high risk for online services. Basically, a Denial 
of Service (DoS) attack is the explicit attempt to disable the available service of a 
victim site or node from a legitimate client(s) by an automatic or manual single attack 
source. The nature of a DoS attack is to deplete the victim's resources such as network 
bandwidth, processing power, or operating system data structures. On the other hand, 
it is also possible that compromised hosts can coordinate to flood the victim with 
overwhelming attack packets. The attack takes place simultaneously from multiple-
attack sources called a Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack. A DDoS network can be 
established by compromising many computers infected by malware that acts 
simultaneously and is coordinated under the control of attacker(s) in order to break 
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into the victim's system, exhaust resources, and force a denial of service. We have 
seen that since 1999, DoS attack technology has continued to evolve and remain a 
serious threat that impacts the service availability on Internet infrastructures, 
organisations and individual hosts. 
Moreover, it is a huge challenge to create a universal DDoS detection. The different 
attack methods and strategies are starting to challenge DDoS defence systems. 
Current DDoS attacks are carried out by attack tools, worms and botnets using 
different packet-transmission rates and packet forms to beat defence systems. These 
various attack strategies lead to defence systems requiring various detection methods 
in order to identify the attacks. In particular, discriminating DDoS flooding attacks 
from flash crowds poses a tough challenge for the network security community. 
Because of the vulnerability of the original design of the Internet, attackers can easily 
mimic the patterns of legitimate network traffic, like flash crowd events, to fly under 
the radar through the victim. The existing fingerprint or feature based algorithms are 
incapable detecting new attack strategies.  
Traffic analysis attack is an approach that reveals private information through analysis 
of traffic metadata. Instead of obtaining the content of communication, intruders use 
traffic analysis attacks which usually focus on whether two entities communicate with 
each other, for example websites that target users’ access. Attackers try to obtain as 
much information as possible from traffic metadata, such as message lengths, number 
of packets, and packet arrival time intervals. The traffic analysis attack is classified 
into two categories: profiling attack and timing attack. In terms of a profiling attack, 
adversaries have a list of possible websites and profiles, and the task is to find which 
ones the target user accesses. Timing attacks are based on the fact that low-latency 
anonymous systems, such as onion routing, do not introduce any delays or 
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significantly alter the timing patterns of an anonymous connection. In HTTP service, 
the time interval of arrival packets of HTML texts and HTTP objects are usually 
similar for the target users and the adversaries. If they access the same webpage, it is 
easier for the adversaries to figure out which website the target user accesses from the 
list. 
Finally, when increasing the level of access anonymity for web services, a disabling 
effect is rendered for any traffic analysis of DDoS detection. In information privacy, 
users can achieve the highest level of so-called perfect anonymity to protect their 
credential information from a third party. By deploying this method, DDoS detection 
is hard to perform data extraction in order to identify the anomalous behaviour of the 
packet source. Therefore, research on this issue of conflict is necessary for 
optimisation of DDoS attack detection and web access anonymity. 
 
1.2 Thesis Overview 
This thesis aims to improve security on service availability and information privacy 
web services. In particular, we focus on the problems of DDoS attacks and traffic 
analysis attacks that impede service availability and jeopardise information privacy. 
Following, is set of methods to solve these problems. 
First, we present DDoS attack detection by differentiating DDoS attack flows from 
flash crowds. We are motivated by the fact that attack flows are generated 
aggressively and simultaneously by pre-built programs (attack tools). However, 
legitimate flash-crowd flows come from an increase in demand of human interest 
events such as breaking news, new promotion campaigns or sport events. These 
legitimate flows increase hesitantly in arrival packets on the server side. Therefore, 
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the self-similarity among DDoS attack flows is much weaker than that among flash 
crowds. We employ abstract distance metrics, the Jeffrey distance, the Sibson 
distance, and the Hellinger distance to measure the similarity among flows to achieve 
our goal. We compared these three metrics to find the one most suitable for our 
purpose. We apply our algorithms to real-trace datasets and demonstrate our results. 
Secondly, we propose a behaviour-based detection that can discriminate DDoS attack 
traffic from legitimate traffic regardless of the various types of the packets and 
methods. We noticed that the individual source of DDoS attacks have unique features 
of repeatable patterns which are different from legitimate flash-crowd traffic. We then 
perform extraction of the repeatable features from packet arrivals in suspicious flows 
which are either DDoS traffic or flash crowd traffic. We also propose a comparable 
detection methods based on the Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The extensive 
simulations were tested for optimisation of the detection methods. We then performed 
experiments with some sample real-trace datasets and our results are also 
demonstrated. 
In addition, we propose an effective approach with a supervised learning system based 
on Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) to discriminate legitimate traffic from DDoS 
attack traffic. Among these behaviours of attack sources, there are repeatable and 
predictable features differentiated from legitimate sources of traffic such as human 
users and Internet proxies. We then analyse the real trace traffic from publicly 
available datasets with triple checks on the repeatable pattern of attack sources. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient and Shannon’s entropy are deployed for extracting 
dependency and predictability of traffic data respectively. Moreover, DDoS defence 
systems have lack of the learning ability to fine-tune the accuracy of detection results. 
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Our proposed system deploys Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) to train and 
classify legitimate and attack traffic flows. 
Furthermore, we propose a creative approach to achieving a high level of information 
privacy on web-based services. Based on Shannon’s perfect secrecy theory, we 
establish a mathematical model for anonymity systems, and transform the anonymous 
communication problem into an optimisation problem. We also perform further 
investigation to reduce cost of the cover traffic. Instead of using dummy packets, the 
prefetched web pages can be used as cover traffic to obtain perfect anonymity in web 
browsing. Moreover, users may expect a trade-off between the degree of anonymity 
and the cost. We therefore define anonymity level as a metric to measure the degrees 
of anonymity. The preliminary experiments on the offline record dataset show the 
huge potential of the proposed strategy in terms of resource saving. 
Finally, we notice there are tradeoffs between the improvement of service availability 
and information privacy. Because we require a high level of anonymity, the 
anonymous traffic makes it difficult for DDoS detection to protect service availability. 
However, if we have to identify the source of a suspicious flow with a high rate of 
accuracy, the anonymity level of traffic must be reduced and the risk of traffic 
analysis attack may increase. We believe that our proposed methods could offer a 
solid foundation of optimisation for security among these research topics. 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
As discussed in the above sections, service availability and information privacy need 
to be improved in network communications. We introduce methods to improve 
methods in service availability against DDoS attack. We then propose and discuss an 
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improvement method for information privacy against traffic-analysis attack which 
may affect the detection of DDoS attacks. Hence, the rest of this thesis is organised as 
follows: 
Chapter 2 examines current and historical trends in the DDoS attacks. This chapter 
reviews the problems of DDoS attacks which consist of various attack strategies and 
packet-transmission methods. This provides a background to the thesis and allows a 
reader to appreciate the motivation behind the design of trade-offs explored in later 
chapters. 
In Chapter 3, we perform the similarity measurement of suspicious traffic flows which 
can be discriminated into DDoS attack flows and flash crowds. The Jeffrey distance, 
the Sibson distance, and the Hellinger distance are the measurement tools used in 
order to achieve our goal.  
Chapter 4 focuses on examining individual sources of suspicious traffic flows using 
data dependency as a measurement tool. In this experiment, we monitor for suspicious 
behaviours such as a repeatable feature of arrival rates from DDoS attack traffic. 
Using the Pearson’s correlation coefficient as a dependency measurement increases 
the chance of detecting and discriminating DDoS attacks and flash crowds. 
 In Chapter 5, we continue to detect dependency and predictability of suspicious 
traffic by using Pearson’s correlation coefficient and Shannon’s entropy respectively. 
Then, we improve the learning ability of DDoS detection by deploying Linear 
Discriminant Analysis (LDA) to train and classify the legitimate and attack traffic 
flows. By doing this triple check, we can discriminate legitimate and attack traffic 
flows with high accuracy. 
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Chapter 6 proposes an approach to improve the level of anonymity in order to achieve 
information privacy in web-based services. With the replacement of dummy packets 
by prefetched web pages, we can reach perfect anonymity based on Shannon’s perfect 
secrecy theory. We provide an adjustable trade-off between the level of anonymity 
and the cost of cover traffic. This links to the optimisation of service availability and 
information privacy. 
Chapter 7 improves perfect anonymity in web browsing using a novel strategy. We 
propose a mathematical model based on Shannon’s perfect secrecy theory for solving 
the problem of high traffic cost. The strategy of using prefetched data as cover traffic 
is proposed to solve this problem. We also define a metric to measure the cost of the 
proposed cover traffic and evaluate the results from the experiments. 
Finally, Chapter 8 provides a summary of the main points of this thesis. We also 
discuss further possibilities for research in the future. 
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CHAPTER 2  
Related Literature 
2.1 DDoS Attack 
DDoS attacks have become an increasing threat to online services over the entire 
Internet. Such attacks can disrupt and discontinue online services from legitimate 
users. For instance, in August 1999, a single system at the University of Minnessota 
was overwhelmed and rendered by a DDoS attack for over two days [1]. Another 
incident happened in August 2001. The worm named Code Red caused isolated 
network conditions due to high scanning and propagation rates [2]. Computer 
Economics [3] estimated that the total economic impact of Code Red was $US 2.6 
billion. Recently, the attacks [4] against the Estonian government and corporate 
Websites in April 2007 and the attacks [5] against the Georgian government and news 
Websites in August 2008 were the most notable incidents of regional hacktivism, with 
hactivism presenting a real threat of DDoS attack and the impact on national 
infrastructure. A recent report [6] has revealed the largest attack size doubled year-by-
year, to more than 100 Gbps which is a surprising 1000% increase in attacks size 
since 2005. 
A DoS attack is an explicit attempt to disable the available service of a victim site or 
node from a legitimate client(s) by an automatic or manual single attack source. The 
nature of a DoS attack is to deplete the victim's resources. These resources can be 
network bandwidth, processing power, or operating system data structures. We have 
seen that since 1999, DoS attack technology has continued to evolve and has 
remained a serious threat with significant impact on Internet infrastructures, 
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organisations and individual hosts [2]. However, it is also possible that compromised 
hosts coordinate to flood a victim with overwhelming attack packets. The attack takes 
place simultaneously from multiple-attack sources called a Distributed DoS (DDoS) 
attack. A DDoS network can be established by compromising many computers 
infected by the malware that acts simultaneously and is coordinated under the control 
of an attacker(s) in order to break into the system of the victim, exhaust resources, and 
force a denial of service. There are two main types of DDoS attacks: typical DDoS 
attacks and distributed reflector DoS (DRDoS) attacks [7]. 
As a variant of DDoS attacks, Reduction of Quality (RoQ) attacks are carried out to 
challenge DDoS defence systems. An RoQ attack is a low-rate DDoS attack that 
attempts to degrade the Quality of Service (QoS) to a victim’s system, but not 
completely deny the services from legitimate client(s) [8, 9]. An RoQ attack is also 
known as a Shrew attack or a Pulsing DoS attack (PDoS) [10, 11]. This type of attack 
is more difficult to detect than the flooding DDoS attacks. In contract, typical DDoS 
flooding attacks are characterised by a sustained high-rate or high volume of packet 
transmission, however a RoQ attack eludes detection of DoS defense mechanisms by 
sending a sufficiently low-average rate. This class of new attacks can be further 
categorised into timeout-based attacks and AIMD-based attacks (AIMD stands for 
Additive Increase and Multiplicative Decrease), depending on the timing of the attack 
pulses with respect to the TCP’s congestion window movement [12, 13]. 
In this chapter, we address two complementary problems and goals: (1) a taxonomy 
for classifying DDoS attack stratagems, and (2) reactive defence strategies. We 
provide more details about DoS, DDoS, and reactive defence techniques including the 
trend and evolution of each topic section. Section 2.2 proposes DDoS network models 
that can be used for investigation and forensics purposes. In Section 2.3, we collect 
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more information about tools, worms and botnets that were part of previous DDoS 
attacks around the world. We also analyse the trend of DDoS attacks from the past 
and consider the possible trend of DDoS attacks in the future. Section 2.4 provides an 
introduction to DDoS defence mechanisms with some details of the reactive 
mechanisms. Section 2.5 classifies detection techniques that have been deployed in 
organisations and developed in research. Section 2.6 introduces traffic analysis attack 
and its possible threat to information privacy. Section 2.7 discusses the challenges of 
DDoS attacks to provide general knowledge for the remaining chapters. In the final 
section of this chapter, we summarise all the information we have discussed about 
DDoS. 
 
2.2 DDoS Network Models 
This section proposes DDoS network models that can be used for investigation and 
forensic purposes. These models cover any current crime scene of a DDoS attack. By 
classifying the attacker-victim relationship of a DDoS network, these models can be 
divided into three different categories: 
− Client-Server DoS network model 
− Typical DDoS network model 
− Distributed Reflector DoS network model 
The details of these classified models are given in the following sub-sections. 
2.2.1 Client-Server DDoS Network Model 
A Client-Server DoS network model is based on the primitive network model of DoS 
attacks [14]. As a direct DoS attack, the attacker client generates and directly sends 
out a large number of attack packets to a victim. It not only impacts the destination 
  
 
victim, but the network resources between the attacker and destination victim are also 
directly affected by the attack. As shown in 
the main attack components 
model consists of the following layers:
 
Figure 1 Hierarchical diagram of 
 
Table 1 A sample of victim responses to typical attacks
Packet Sent 
TCP SYN (to open port)
TCP FIN (to close port)
TCP ACK 
TCP DATA 
TCP RST 
TCP NULL 
ICMP ECHO Request
ICMP TS Request 
UDP packet (to open port)
UDP packet (to close port)
 
 
Desired Effect Victim
Figure 1, the proposed model considers 
with the additional layer from the reflected attack. The 
 
 
a Client-Server DoS network model
 [15]  
Response from Victim (Backscatter)
 
 
 
 
 
TCP SYN/ACK 
TCP RST (ACK) and TCP FIN (to close port)
TCP RST (ACK) 
TCP RST (ACK) 
No response 
TCP RST (ACK) 
ICMP ECHO Reply 
ICMP TS Reply 
Protocol dependent 
ICMP port unreached 
Side-Effect Victim Layer
Adverse Effect Victim
Target Victim Layer
Attacker Layer
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a) Attacker Layer consists of attackers acting in mainly an infamous role during 
DoS attacks. In high-rate DoS attacks, the attacker client(s) generates and 
directly sends out a large number of attack packets to the victim. Not only is 
the target victim, but also the network resources between the attacker and 
target victim are directly affected by the attacks. 
b) Target Victim Layer consists of a single or a group of victims which are 
targeted by DoS attacker(s). In high-rate DoS attacks, the victim’s host and 
resources forcibly receive a large number of attack packets. Without proper 
DoS defence systems, the victim’s resources may be disrupted and forced 
down. This potentially causes a DoS. 
c) Side-Effect Victim Layer introduces additional layers after the Target Victim 
Layer in order to represent the secondary effects of DoS attacks. This layer 
may consist of third-party hosts or network entities, also called backscatter 
victims. The side-effects can occur when the attacker generates a spoofed 
source IP address in the IP header of each attack packet. If the attacker 
generates source IP addresses randomly, the backscatter response packets from 
the victim will be sent back to random destinations as shown in Table 1. For 
example, some attack packets, such as ICMP requests, require a response 
(reply) from the victim’s host or network equipment. These reply messages 
may be sent directly to other hosts instead of the original attack sources. This 
effect can be collected by network telescopes as indirect evidence of such 
attacks. For investigation and forensics purposes, we propose and divide this 
layer into two sub-classes of third-party (backscatter) victims: 
− Desired Effect Victim is the third-party victim the attacker specifies in the 
source IP address in each attack packet. These third-party victims may 
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impact the increasing volume of traffic from the reply messages. For any 
reason, the target victim may believe that all attacks come from third-party 
victims. The attacker can take advantage of this and hide the attacker’s 
clients, blame the scapegoats and make the investigation process harder. 
There is a highly risky potential that the attacker can cause conflict between 
the third-party and target victims if they lack proper defence mechanisms, 
transparent and there is strong evidence. We hope this scenario never arises 
up like the cyber-war incident between Estonia and Russia in April 2007 [4] 
and the incident between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 [5]. 
− Adverse Effect Victim is the third-party victim whose source IP address is 
not specified by the attacker in each attack packet. This sub-class refers to 
the nature of the most DDoS attacks with randomly generated forged source 
IP addresses. Although these third-party victims may rarely be impacted 
with increasing volumes of traffic from the reply messages, the target victim 
may still believe that all attacks came from third-party victims. The attacker 
can take this advantage of this by hiding the attacker’s clients and making 
the investigation process harder. In addition, the flooding with spoofed 
source IP addresses can amplify the attack when the reply message does not 
reach the destination hosts. The router will generate and return victim ICMP 
“Host Unreachable” packets and TCP RST packets if the destination does 
not exist or the TTL has reached 0 as shown in Table 1. 
2.2.2 Typical DDoS Network Model 
Typical DDoS network mode is based on a hierarchy of DDoS attack tools. The 
agents are representatives of the attacker to offend the victim. An agent can be a 
botnet or zombie that is running the daemon program that listens to the attacker’s 
  
 
commands. The attacker may create additional computers, called 
server, in order to issue the command to the compromised agents. The attacker may 
directly issue the attack commands to the handler or connect the handler by a 
computer host, called the attacker client
problems and render attack tracking more difficult. A set of agents may be created in 
order to amplify the attack by establishing DDoS. With various techniques and 
programs for compromising and attacking the victim, this group of computers is 
created as a DDoS network
created as a DDoS attack tool
considerate the main attack components and additional layers that 
the reflected attack. This model consists of the following layers:
 
Figure 2 Hierarchical diagram of 
 
a) Attacker Layer consists of the attackers as described in Section 2.
However, in this model, the attacker client(s) may not directly attack the target 
victim but issues attack controls and commands to its masters.
Desired Effect Victim
handler
. This technique can avoid resource limitation 
 and this set of programs using in these computers is 
. As shown in Figure 2, the proposed model may 
are 
 
a Typical DDoS network model
 
Side-Effect Victim Layer
Adverse Effect Victim
Target Victim Layer
Slave Layer
Master Layer
Attacker Layer
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b) Master Layer is an additional layer between the attackers and the target 
victims in order to conceal the attacker’s clients from the investigation. The 
layer consists of master servers or handlers which are controlled by the 
attacker’s client. Not only listening to the commands issued from the attacker, 
handlers also have responsibility to compromise a group of machines in case of 
DDoS attack. When the commands are issued, a handler may provide a 
translation or forward them to the compromised machines belonging to this 
handler. The handler is the key control point and the effective anonymiser of 
the network that the attacker has additional care of [16]. In order to eliminate a 
single point of failure, more than one handler is found in practice, and in most 
cases each handler has equal power over its agents [16]. 
c) Slave Layer is an additional layer between the attackers and the target victims 
in order to conceal the attacker’s client and handler from the investigation. 
This layer consists of slave machines (also known as daemons, zombies, 
agents, or botnets). Each slave agent may report and listen to a single or group 
of handlers, but does not have direct contact to the attacker’s client. In high-
rate DDoS attacks, instead of direct attack from an attacker’s client, the slave 
agents generate and send out large numbers of attack packets directly to the 
victim. Not only is the target victim affected, but the network resources 
between the slave agents and target victim are also directly affected by the 
attacks. 
d) Target Victim Layer consists of a single or a group of victims as described in 
Section 2.2.1(b). 
e) Side-Effect Victim Layer introduces additional layers after the Target Victim 
as described in Section 2.2.1(c). 
  
 
2.2.3  Distributed Reflector DoS Network Model
Figure 3 Hierarchical diagram of 
 
Distributed reflector DoS (DRDoS) network mode is based on DDoS network 
architecture with reflectors. DRDoS
Distributed Reflected DoS
IP address. An attacker may alter the source IP address
are aimed at the victim. The attack pack
computers or network devices. Without proper spoofed IP checking, replies 
requests will be made as common services. Unfortunately, the reply packets will be 
transmitted directly to the target victim as the source IP address specified rather than 
transmitted to the original attacking sources. 
model considers the main attack components and additional layers that 
from the reflected attack. The model consists of the following layers:
a) Attacker Layer consists of the attackers as described in Section 2.2.1(a). 
However, in this model, the attacker client(s) may not directly attack the target 
victim but issue attack controls and commands to its masters.
 
 
a Distributed Reflector DoS network model
 is also called Distributed Reflection DoS
. Reflector-based attack is an effect from a 
 in the attack packets
ets are then transmitted to 
As shown in Figure 3
 
 
Target Victim Layer
Reflector Layer
Slave Layer
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Attacker Layer
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b) Master Layer is an additional layer between the attackers and the target 
victims in order to conceal the attacker’s client from the investigation. This 
layer consists of master servers or handlers as described in Section 2.2.2(b). 
c) Slave Layer is an additional layer between the attackers and the target victims 
in order to conceal attacker’s client and handler from the investigation. This 
layer consists of slave machines as described in Section 2.2.2(c). However, in 
high-rate DDoS attacks, instead of a direct attack to the target victim, the slave 
agents generate and send out a large number of attack packets directly to other 
machines called reflectors in order to aggregate the reflected response/reply 
messages to add the target victim. In fact, the DDoS attack with reflectors 
needs to alter the source IP address into the victim’s IP address. The 
destination IP address that targets reflectors may be generated randomly or 
specifically. 
d) Reflector Layer consists of a single or a number of reflector machines. The 
reflectors are not the infected or compromised machines. However, they can be 
used as an attack relay or amplifier to gain the degree of damage. They are also 
used to conceal the main network architecture (consisting of attackers, masters 
and slaves) from the investigation. 
e) Target Victim Layer consists of a single or group of victims as described in 
Section 2.2.1(b). 
2.2.4  Evolution of the DDoS Network Architecture 
Early DoS attack technology involved simple tools that generated and sent packets 
from a single source aimed at a single destination. In June 1999, DoS tools were 
deployed and evolved to execute a single source attack against multiple targets, 
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multiple source attacks against single targets, and multiple source attacks against 
multiple targets [2]. 
The tread of attacks is to deploy multiple-attack sources against single-target attacks 
since 1999. The distributed computing models have evolved and coordinated many 
one-to-one attacks that sufficiently escape the traditional model. Rather than relying 
on a single attack source, attackers can now take advantage of thousands of more 
systems to force a DoS to the victims [16]. 
Today, the most common type of DoS attack involves sending a large number of 
packets, called packet flooding attack, to a destination. This causes overwhelming 
disruption for the host and for network performance, including the availability of 
victim sites, routers, servers and even firewalls [2]. Packet flooding attacks also affect 
the upstream Internet Service Provider (ISP) [17]. Based on reported DoS activity, 
multiple-target attacks are less common [2]. 
Most DDoS attacks have involved thousands of compromised host systems that were 
external to the victim’s own system or network. In many cases, the launch point 
consists of one or more systems that have been subverted by an attack via a security-
related compromise rather than from the attacker’s own system or systems [2]. 
 
2.3  DDoS Attack Sources 
The mass-intrusion phase is an initial installation of DDoS attack architecture. 
Automated tools are utilised to compromise a large number of computers remotely. 
These compromised systems then become DDoS server (handlers) in the Master 
Layer and DDoS agents (zombies) in the Slave Layer. Therefore, these computers are 
the primary victims [18]. After the mass-intrusion phase, these compromised systems, 
which constitute the DDoS handlers and DDoS agents, are ready to begin the attack. 
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For example, a Stacheldraht handler can control up to 5,000 agents [17]. The DDoS 
systems are artificially generate massive attacks against one or more targeted systems 
and its resources. These are secondary victims in the Victim Layer [18].  
Most DDoS attack architecture is implemented in a 4-tier client/server model. As 
shown in Figure 4, the attacker has to install the front-end client and communicates 
with the handlers. The handler controls a number of agents on a compromised system 
to perform DDOS attacks [17]. We have collected many DDoS attack tools, worms 
and bots as we have seen many infamous attack incidents around the world. 
 
Figure 4 Network diagram of DDoS attack tools 
2.3.1 DDoS Attack Tools 
In the past decade, DDoS attack tools have been developed from DoS attack 
programs, hacking programs, malware, client-server communication models, and 
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hactivities. The following lists examples of well-known and infamous DDoS attack 
tools. 
a) The early DDoS attack tools appeared in 1998. These were clumsy attempts 
to naturally evolve beyond coordinated attacks, but nevertheless laid the 
foundation for the subsequent tools. The first of them, fapi, featured UDP, TCP 
(SYN and ACK), and ICMP Echo floods. Its handler to agent communication 
was UDP-based. It did not provide easy controls for setting up the DDoS 
network, and did not handle networks over 10 hosts very well. The second one, 
fuck_them, was a distributed ICMP Echo Reply flooder, where the attacker 
either supplied the source address to spoof or randomised source addresses 
were generated (all 32 bits of the IP address) [16].  
b)  Trinoo (or Trin00) is the first well known distributed network DDoS tool 
which was used to mount an attack against a system at the University of 
Minnesota in August 1999 [1, 19]. Trinoo tools are made up of master (server) 
and slave (daemon) programs. A Trinoo network is able to set up thousands of 
systems on the Internet that have been compromised by a remote buffer 
overrun by exploitation. A Trinoo network is carried out by an attacker 
(intruder) connecting to a Trinoo master and giving instruction to launch a 
denial of service attack against one or more IP addresses. The Trinoo master 
then communicates with the slave daemons giving instructions to attack one or 
more IP address for a specified period of time. The tool is capable of only 
generating UDP packets floods [16]. However, source addresses were not 
spoofed, so systems running the offending slave daemons were contacted [1, 
16]. WinTrinoo is a Trinoo variant version which is able to run on a Microsoft 
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Windows Operating systems that was first reported to CERT on February 2000 
(CERT IN-2000-01) [20-22]. 
c) Mstream (and Mstream2) is a primitive multiple-stream tool with a very 
efficient point-to-point stream TCP ACK flood [16]. An Mstream agent was 
discovered in late April 2000 on a compromised Linux system at a major 
university [23]. With very limited control and incomplete features compared to 
earlier DDoS attack tools, Mstream seemed to be in its early development 
stages. However, the year-2000 version can spoof the source IP address by 
randomising all 32 bits [16]. 
d) Other DDoS attack tools are Tribe Flood Network (TFN), Stacheldraht, 
Carko, Shaft, Omega, Trinity, MyServer, Plague, Knight, Kaiten, etc. [2, 14, 
16-19, 24-27]. 
2.3.2  DDoS Attack Worms 
Malware can carry DDoS attack mechanisms that perform attacks without controlling 
or issuing a command from an attacker. Because the DDoS malware has been 
programmed to attack at a specific date and time to the specific targets by specific 
attack methods, the attack could proceed automatically whether or not it needed 
synchronisation between each other. The following are examples of well-known and 
infamous DDoS attack worms. 
a) Nimda worm/virus was isolated in September 2001. The worm's name spelled 
backwards is admin. Nimda affected Windows platforms such as Windows 95, 
98, Me, NT, and 2000. Nimda exploits various Microsoft IIS 4.0 / 5.0 directory 
traversal vulnerabilities. Multiple propagation vectors allowed Nimda to 
become the Internet’s most widespread virus/worm. The high scanning rate of 
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the Nimda worm may also cause bandwidth DoS conditions on networks with 
infected machines [28]. 
b) Code Red worm exploits the Buffer Overflow vulnerability in the Indexing 
Service on systems running Microsoft IIS [27]. Code Red included 
functionality to launch a TCP SYN flood attack against a specific target. The 
worm also caused isolated DoS conditions due to high scanning and 
propagation rates [2]. More than 250,000 systems were infected with Code Red 
in just 9 hours on 19 July 2001 [3, 29]. Computer Economics estimated that the 
total economic impact of Code Red was $US 2.6 billion [3]. The Code Red II 
worm began to propagate much like the earlier Code Red worm in August 
2001. The worm exploits the Buffer Overflow in Microsoft IIS 4.0 Servers 
with Indexing Service DLL and URL Redirection Enabled [2]. 
c) Other DDoS attack worms are Power, Blaster, Mydoom, etc. [27, 30, 31]. 
2.3.3  DDoS Attack Botnets 
Rather than relying on a handler network, DDoS attack botnets take advantage of an 
existing Internet Relay Chat (IRC) network for its handler-to-agent communications, 
and makes the handler a channel on IRC. This attack architecture compromises a large 
number of computers, which later install an Internet robot application called bot. The 
bot typically connects automatically to a remote IRC server to enable remote control 
by the attacker. The controlled bot is then transformed into a botnet which is used for 
generating spam emails, viruses, and worms as well as DDoS attacks [32].  
This section presents 4 infamous botnets, namely Agobot, RBot, and Storm worm. 
Note that these botnets have a few hundred to a thousand variants due to multiple 
authors working to enhance the exploitation, propagation and communication code. 
Hence, we present the enhanced version with the most advanced DDoS attack tools. 
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Figure 5 Network diagram of DDoS attack botnets. 
 
a) AgoBot (PhatBot) is one of the most popular bots with over 600 different 
versions [32, 33]. Variants of Agobot include Gaobot, Nortonbot, Phatbot and 
Polybot. The bot was written in C++ and provides cross platform capabilities. 
Its structure is designed into modules and allows extension for additional 
modules. Agobots have many features such as a password protected IRC client, 
remotely updating and removing the installed bot, executing programs and 
commands, port scanner to search and infect other hosts, and DDoS attacks 
[33]. This has the most comprehensive set of DDoS attack tools that combine 
attack features such as SYN flood, UDP flood, ICMP flood, HTTP flood and 
TARGA3 attack [32]. Agobot may contain other features such as packet 
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sniffer, keylogger, polymorphic code, rootkit installer, Information harvest, 
SMTP client, or HTTP client [33]. 
b) RBot (GTBot) has over 1600 variants. It is also written in C++ and targets 
Windows systems. RBot and its variants have the features of the Local 
Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) to exploit and master 
passwords for scanning and compromising Optix servers. Their attack features 
are SYN flood, ACK flood, random (SYN or ACK) flood, UDP flood, ICMP 
flood, and ping flood [32]. 
c) Storm worm (bot) created DDoS attacks against a number of anti-spam 
websites on January 12, 2007 [34]. It has been estimated that 85,000 machines 
have been compromised into botnets with 35,000 botnets sending 3 billion 
spams emails per day [35]. Strom worm is a variant of Nuwar and also called 
Small.DAM, Peacomm, Zhelatin, Dorf, Downloader, SMALL.EDW, Zhelatin, 
Peed, and Tibs. The DDoS attack was conducted by game4.exe. The control 
and communication are via HTTP on random ports with base64/zlib encoding, 
P2P-based server directory [34]. It received the target IP address and attack 
type by downloading a configuration file from a hard-coded website in the 
body of the Trojan. Attacks can be either a (port 80) TCP/SYN flood, ping 
flood, or both. The configuration file specifies the target by IP address alone 
because the tool has no provisions to resolve DNS names to addresses [34]. 
d) Other DDoS attack botnets are SDBot, Spybot, Reptile, ZoTob, PBot, 
Tsunami, Kelvir, MetaFisher, etc. [32, 36]. 
2.3.4  Evolution of the DDoS Attack Sources 
Hybrid versions of DDoS attacks are being increasingly developed. From time to 
time, DDoS attack tools and malware have benefited and learnt from each other. 
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Malicious and offensive tactics and techniques have been added into the hybrid 
versions that attack victims. As we have seen in late August/early September 1999, 
there was a shift from the well-known DDoS attack tool, Trinoo, to TFN. Then one 
month later, the hybrid version, Stacheldraht, began attacking systems in Europe and 
the United States [18]. From analysis [18], it was obvious that the encryption of 
communication channels and more automated maintenance of large networks was in 
active development. With the impressive features of malware and bots, DDoS attack 
tools aim to advance DDoS attack botnets which can cause massive destruction to the 
site of victims. DDoS attack tools have implemented the features of propagation from 
malware such as worms, viruses, and Trojans. As we witnessed the high-scanning rate 
and high-propagation rate of Nimda, Code Red, and Blaster, the hybrid botnets 
implement these features in order to compromise as many slave agents as possible on 
the Internet. For example, recent reports [37] show that the Kraken botnet has 
compromised at least 400,000 machines sending 200 billion spam messages in a day. 
In particular, the DDoS attack botnet named Storm, has been estimated to have 
compromised 85,000-200,000 machines with only 35,000 botnets sending 3 billion 
spam email per day and attacking distinct victims [35, 37, 38]. 
In addition, DDoS attacks are increasing interoperability and independency of 
platforms. TFN and TFN2K have been found to be the earliest DDoS tool available on 
the Windows platform, while Stacheldraht to date, only works on a UNIX platform 
[17]. Windows machines have been used as agents producing various types of DoS 
attacks for years [21]. However, MacOS 9 can also be used as a traffic amplifier, to 
flood victims with high traffic volume. An attacker [19] can use this asymmetry to 
amplify traffic by a factor of approximately 37.5, thus enabling an attack with limited 
bandwidth to flood a much larger connection. This is similar in effect and structure to 
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a SMURF attack but it is not necessary to use a directed broadcast to achieve traffic 
amplification. 
Moreover, there is an increasing level of automation for attack sources. Advances in 
automation techniques for new self-propagating worms in 2001 have been used to 
deploy DoS attack technology [2]. In the past, most DDoS attack programs, later 
called DDoS attack tools, were often installed onto compromised machines mostly by 
manual means. Over time, attackers have developed and employed advanced 
automation of scanning patterns in multiple aspects of DoS attack technology 
deployment. Earlier scanning programs/tools manually provided lists of potentially 
vulnerable hosts which meant it was easier to exploit these machines. The next step 
was the addition of automated tools in an attempt to exploit and record lists of 
compromised hosts that later become handlers and slave agents. These types of lists 
were often used to exploit vulnerable systems and install attack tools. Today, similar 
to worm’s self-propagation, automatic widespread scanning is one of the self-
propagation techniques used to find new vulnerable hosts. Scanning activity is an 
initial phase of automation to compromise potential of slave agents to be employed by 
attackers. Automation of high-rate scanning and self-propagation of attack tools 
effectively become a DoS attack if they are high enough to reach the point. For 
instance, we have seen DDoS worms like Code Red and Nimda self-propagate to a 
point of global saturation in less than 18 hours which caused DoS in some 
organisations’ networks [3]. 
Furthermore, there is increasing use of IRC channels as a communication tool. 
Recently, we have seen that control mechanisms for DDoS attack networks are 
shifting to use the technology of Internet Relay Chat (IRC) [2]. Attacker use of IRC 
protocols and networks as a communication channel for DDoS networks essentially 
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removes the unnecessary exploitation and replaces the useful functions of a handler in 
primitive DDoS network models. IRC-based DDoS networks are sometimes referred 
to as botnets, which alludes to the concept of bots on IRC networks as being software 
driven participants rather than human participants. For example, Entitee and Trinity 
v3 have both been found on the Undernet Internet Relay Chat (IRC) network by the 
Undernet operators, each using different IRC channels [14] [24]. Later we have also 
found that Agobot, SDBot, RBot, Spybot and the Storm worm successfully used IRC 
protocol as a backbone for a communication channel and IRC servers as handlers for 
DDoS attacks [32]. Other public communication channels such as Simple Mail 
Transfer Protocol (SMTP), HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Instant 
Messaging (IM) are available for DDoS communication networks [3, 33]. For 
example, Agobot provides features for an SMTP and HTTP client to issue DDoS 
commands [33]. As a result, it has become increasingly difficult to differentiate 
attack/anomaly signatures from normal/legitimate network traffic. 
 
2.4 DDoS Reactive Defence Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 DDoS defence strategies with time-line diagram. 
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In general, DDoS defence strategies concern 3 main activities: (1) Prevention, (2) 
Detection, and (3) Response. 
The prevention strategy aims to (1) eliminate the possibility of a DDoS attack 
altogether, (2) mitigate the effect of a DDoS attack before the zero-day attack begins 
and (3) enable potential victims to endure the attack without denying services to 
legitimate clients [39]. These could be successful by implementing proactive 
mechanisms such as router filtering (Ingress and Egress), and Intrusion Prevention 
System (IPS). 
− Ingress filtering is a packet filtering technique employed by ISPs against 
source spoofing addresses of Internet traffic. Incoming packets need to 
prove that which network they came from. 
− Egress filtering is a packet filtering technique employed by an internal 
network against unauthorised use of machines. The filter is implemented in 
the router to make sure that outgoing packets are safe when they leave from 
the internal network to external networks. 
− Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) is a network security devices that 
detect network and/or system activities for malicious or unwanted 
behaviour, and can react in real-time to block or prevent those activities. 
Intrusion prevention technology is considered by some to be an extension of 
intrusion detection (IDS) technology. 
While ingress and egress filters at the border routers can limit the problems caused by 
attacking agents faking source addresses, IPS will proactively operate in-line to 
monitor all network traffic for malicious code or attack. However, the filtering 
method does not effectively protect against flooding attacks which originate from 
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valid prefixes (IP addresses), but it will prohibit an attacker within the originating 
network from launching an attack of this nature using forged source addresses that do 
not match to ingress filtering rules. For example, TFN2K has specifically been 
designed to break the security rules of ingress filtering [19].  
Reference [18] suggests that RFC-2267 style egress filtering may protect attack 
packets from somewhere within border routers, or on each subnet. Ethernet switches 
will make this more difficult to attack local subnets, which mean an intrusion 
detection system (IDS) just inside the borders would be a recommended way of 
detection for the entire network. 
The next section will explain the reactive mechanism for DDoS defence (also referred 
to as Early Warning Systems and Early Detection Systems) which is responsible for 
detecting the attack and respond to it immediately [7]. Because DDoS attacks can 
threaten the availability of victim’s service, the reactive mechanism shall restrain the 
degree of impact on the victim site. 
 
2.5 DDoS Detection Strategies 
Detection is an important process to extract and discriminate DDoS attacks from 
legitimate network activities. DDoS attack detection is normally implemented on an 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS), in particular a Network Intrusion Detection System 
(NIDS). 
As a statistical result in Table 2, the results of the DDoS detection systems are 
measured by the following criteria: 
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Table 2 Measurement of detection systems 
Measurement Detected In Fact 
True Positive Legitimate Activity Legitimate Activity 
True Negative Intrusive Activity Intrusive Activity 
False Positive Intrusive Activity Legitimate Activity 
False Negative Legitimate Activity Intrusive Activity 
 
− True Positive occurs when IDS correctly classifies legitimate activities as 
unharmed activities. 
− True Negative occurs when IDS correctly classifies intrusive activities as 
intrusions. 
− False Positive occurs when IDS incorrectly classifies legitimate activities 
as intrusions. 
− False Negative occurs when IDS incorrectly classifies intrusive activities 
as unharmed activities. 
Most of the research we surveyed on detection mechanisms involved a trade-off 
between false positive and false negative which results in an acceptable level. A 
threshold value could be concerned with an issue of accuracy for DDoS detection 
[40], with the more restrictive tests increasing the risk of rejecting true positives, and 
the more sensitive tests increasing the risk of accepting false positives. Hence, the 
threshold value can be used to optimise the best results for the tests. 
The main detection strategies classified by detection criteria are signature-based 
detection, anomaly detection, hybrid detection systems and third-party detection. 
2.5.1 Signature-based detection 
Signature-based methods scan and monitor patterns (signatures) in observed network 
traffic that match known attack signatures from a database. Signature-based detection 
that implements intrusion detection is also known as misuse detection or pattern 
matching detection [7, 41, 42]. 
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These methods can easily and reliably detect known attacks with no false positives 
encountered. However they cannot recognise new attacks or even slight variations of 
old attacks. Moreover, like anti-virus programs, the signature database must always be 
kept up-to-date in order to retain the reliability of the system for new attacks [7]. 
2.5.2 Anomaly detection 
Anomaly detection derives from heuristic-based detection and is also known as 
anomaly-based detection or profile-based detection which compares the parameters of 
observed network traffic with normal traffic. In other words, anomaly detection 
attempts to identify behaviour that does not conform to normal behaviour [43]. 
A heuristic-based method is an expert-based analysis using an algorithm to determine 
the susceptibility of a system towards a particular threat/risk using various decision 
rules or weighing methods. Heuristic-based methods are also employed by many anti-
virus programs that are designed to detect previously unknown computer viruses, in 
addition to new variants of viruses already in the wild.  
A Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) also employs heuristic-based methods 
using behavioural patterns of users, applications and other program files to develop a 
pattern of normal and abnormal behaviour, which is then used to detect the occurrence 
of an attack [40]. Although the detection can be prone to a large number of false 
positives, it is possible for new attacks to be detected. However, in order to prevent a 
false alarm, the model of normal traffic must always be kept up-to-date and the 
threshold of categorising an anomaly must be properly optimised [7]. Based on the 
specification of normal behaviour, we divide anomaly detection mechanisms into 
standard and trained mechanisms [39]. 
  
32 
 
a) Standard mechanisms use standard specifications of normal behaviour that 
rely on some standard protocol or set of rules. The advantage of a standard-
based specification is that it generates no false positives; all legitimate traffic 
must comply with the specified behaviour. The disadvantage is that attackers 
can still perform sophisticated attacks which, on the surface, seem compliant to 
the standard and thus pass undetected [39]. 
b) Trained mechanisms use trained specifications of normal behaviour to 
monitor network traffic and system behaviour and generate threshold values 
for different parameters. All communications exceeding one or more 
(depending on the approach) of these values are regarded as anomalous. 
Trained models catch a broad range of attacks, but have two disadvantages. 
These are (1) Threshold setting. Anomalies are detected when the current 
system state differs from the model by a certain threshold. The setting of a low 
threshold leads to many false positives, while a high threshold reduces the 
sensitivity of the detection mechanism. (2) Model update. Systems and 
communication patterns evolve with time, and models need to be updated to 
reflect these changes. Trained specification systems usually perform automatic 
model updates using statistics gathered at a time when no attack was detected. 
This approach makes the detection mechanism vulnerable to a slow increase in 
the rate of attacks that can, over a long period of time, delay or even avoid 
attack detection, or mislead models [39]. 
2.5.3 Hybrid detection system 
A hybrid detection system combines both previous detection methods. These systems 
update their signature database with attacks detected by anomaly detection. Again the 
danger is significant because an attacker can fool the system by characterising normal 
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traffic as an attack. In this case, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) becomes an 
attack tool. Thus IDS designers must be very careful because their research can have 
repercussion [7].  
Non-dependence upon signatures and the use of statistical and behavioural patterns as 
a mean to detect new types of malicious code allows for a low false negative rate. 
2.5.4 Third-party detection 
Mechanisms that deploy third-party detection do not handle the detection process 
themselves, but rely on an external message that signals the occurrence of an attack 
and provides characterisation of attack. Examples of third-party detection are easily 
found among traceback mechanisms [39]. 
 
2.6 Traffic Analysis Attacks 
Traffic analysis is the process of intercepting and examining messages in order to 
infer information from patterns in communication. The information is inferred and 
extracted for network meta-data, including volumes and timing of network packets, as 
well as visible network addresses they are originated from and destined for [44]. In 
general, the greater the number of messages observed, intercepted and or even stored, 
the more that can be inferred from the traffic. 
Traffic analysis can be a concern of computer security. In the case of anonymous 
communications, an adversary would use this data to perform traffic-analysis with the 
aim of tracing the originator or the ultimate destination of a connection, therefore 
violating the anonymity properties that the system is designed to provide [44]. 
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In information security, a traffic analysis attack is used against the encryption 
mechanism. In general, traffic analysis can be used to resolve what type of 
information is being communicated such as chat, email, web page requests, etc., even 
if the data itself is scrambled, or encrypted. To reveal encrypted information, an 
attacker is required to monitor the frequency and timing of network packets. 
A timing attack can use timing information as a way to reveal further information. In 
SSH protocol, the time between keystroke messages can be studied using hidden 
Markov models [45]. During an interactive session, SSH transmits each keystroke 
typed by a user which is sent to a remote machine in a separate IP packet. Learning 
the inter-keystroke timing information of typed passwords allows eavesdroppers to 
deduce the content of passwords. This suggests that SSH is not as secure as 
commonly believed. 
Onion routing systems are used to gain traffic anonymity. Traffic analysis can be used 
to attack anonymous communication systems like the Tor anonymity network [46]. 
We used to believe that Tor intermediaries, through the use of encrypted tunnels, 
effectively hid the bit patterns of data travelling though a Tor connection. An 
adversary therefore, cannot use any information from the content to trace the stream 
and has to resort to traffic analysis. However, present research [44] showed that traffic 
analysis allows adversaries to infer which nodes relay the anonymous streams. This 
reduces the anonymity provided by Tor. Research has also shown that otherwise 
unrelated streams may be linked back to the same initiator. 
Packet padding is an approach to resist a timing analysis attack. In a low-latency 
onion routing network, data flows are carried by a variable rate. Packets cannot be 
delayed too much, or dropped in order to satisfy the requirements of quality of service 
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(QoS). Therefore, to conceal the relationship between incoming and outgoing traffic 
flows, dummy traffic (padding) must be added to the original data flows [47]. The use 
of dummy traffic is used to send random data in addition to normal communications. 
Data packets leaving each node are augmented by dummy packets which the 
adversary cannot distinguish from (encrypted) real data packets. This can be 
inconsistent, with more bandwidth and processing power being used, which is usually 
an optional feature of a secure connection. 
 
2.7 Research Challenges 
While most ISPs now have the infrastructure to detect bandwidth flood attacks, many 
still lack the ability to rapidly mitigate DDoS attacks with some detection and 
mitigation systems still taking a long time [48]. Rate limiting, packet filtering, and 
reconfiguration application parameters can, in some cases, mitigate and limit the 
impact of DoS attacks, but usually only at points where the DoS attack is consuming 
fewer resources than is available. In many cases, the only defence is a reactive one 
where the source or sources of an ongoing attack are identified and prevented from 
continuing the attack. Defending against DoS attacks is therefore, far from an exact or 
complete science [2]. 
In general, DDoS detection methods are based on features or fingerprints of specific 
DDoS attacks. These include activity profiling, sequential change-point detection, 
wavelet analysis, and chi-square/entropy. Unfortunately, it is very easy for hackers to 
mimic these features to fool user detection methods. For example, because of the open 
architecture of the Internet, hackers can spoof the source IP addresses of attack 
packets according to real Internet IP address distribution against our source address 
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distribution based detection algorithms. Hackers can also change the TTL value of the 
attack packets against our hop-count detection methods according to the real hop 
distance between zombies and victims respectively. 
Lack of flexibility in DDoS detection can cause a rise in false positives/negatives. A 
counter attack method cannot follow ever changing attack methods, as the attack 
patterns occasionally change, and the attacker may mimic the network traffic patterns 
of flash crowds, causing the detector to be quickly disabled. The entropy detector can 
raise the alarm for crowd access, however, it cannot discriminate DDoS attacks from 
the surge of legitimate accesses, e.g. flash crowds. The change-point detection method 
can increase the number of attack packets very slowly but this method can be easily 
deceived which will almost surely disable the change point detectors, e.g. zombies can 
increase the number of attack packets very slowly. 
Discriminating DDoS flooding attacks from flash crowds poses a tough challenge for 
the network security community. Because of the vulnerability of the original design of 
the Internet, attackers can easily mimic the patterns of legitimate network traffic, like 
flash crowd events, to fly under the radar through a victim. For example, in a flash 
crowd event, many sports fans will access the official website when an important 
sports match takes place or many people will the check CNN website when breaking 
news occurs. Attackers may mimic the behaviours of these flash crowds which 
become a sudden increase of legitimate traffic. In addition, DDoS attacks and flash 
crowds share similar behaviours, and we have to differentiate them effectively, 
otherwise, we may raise a false alarm. In fact, it is a big challenge for defenders to 
discriminate DDoS flooding attacks from flash events and the consequences are 
serious if the detection system cannot discriminate between them. On one hand, the 
attack source can impersonate the traffic features of flash crowds to malfunction the 
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detectors. On the other hand, the detectors may treat the legitimate flash crowds as 
DDoS attacks raising false positives. 
With different DDoS attack methods and strategies, creating universal DDoS 
detection is a huge challenge. Current DDoS attacks are carried out by attack tools, 
worms and botnets using different packet-transmission rates and packet forms to beat 
defence systems. DDoS attack sources have the ability to generate various packet-
transmission forms such as the constant rate attack, increasing rate attack, flash-crowd 
(FC) attack, and low-rate (LDoS) attack (e.g. Reduction-of-Quality (RoQ) attacks, 
periodical attack, shrew attack, and pulsing attack). These different forms of attack 
packet transmission pose more difficult challenges for research on defending valuable 
online services. Moreover, various forms of attack packets can be generated and 
transmitted to victims based on their type of service. For example, attack packets may 
be malformed IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, Application-based floods, etc. Hence, we require 
various detection methods for defence systems in order to cover all various attack 
strategies. 
While improvement of information privacy, in particular increasing anonymity levels, 
may prevent a traffic analysis attack, DDoS detection and traceback are far from 
successful. This is because DDoS detection needs to perform traffic analysis to extract 
information of suspicious packets, such as IP headers, arrival rates, application data, 
etc. However, if the information of packet sources is hidden from the public by a high 
level of anonymity, it is really difficult for potential victims to implement measures 
for early detection and prevention. In order to indentify the anomalous behaviour of 
the packet source, we do need to reach a negotiation stage between a high level of 
anonymity and DDoS detection. Therefore, a suitable approach that needs 
improvement is a balance in the adjustment of data privacy. 
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2.8 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed historical and current trends in the development of DDoS 
attacks. It examined in detail the three main network models of DDoS attacks: Client-
Server DoS network, Typical DDoS network, and Distributed Reflector DoS network. 
These models could be useful for investigation and forensics purposes when attack 
incidents occur. We also examined the DDoS attack sources: DDoS attack tools, 
DDoS attack worms, and DDoS attack botnets. These attack sources also have their 
own attack abilities and strategies in order to impede their target victims. The aim of 
this chapter was to provide a background for the rest of this thesis as well as allow the 
reader to follow research material discussed in later chapters. The following chapters 
focus on the challenges and problems pointed out here, and where appropriate, are 
expanded on in the literature review. 
This chapter has also discussed the design tradeoffs of DDoS detection strategies 
compared with different detection criteria. However, these detection approaches lack 
flexibility and cause a rise in false positive/negative rates. Discrimination between 
DDoS attacks and legitimate flash crowds aimed to further push research on 
mitigation techniques. Universal DDoS detection was proposed in order to detect the 
most infamous DDoS attacks through the use of various methods of packet 
transmission and various types of attack packets. Finally, the problems with the 
improvement of information privacy were briefly reviewed to explore optimisation for 
DDoS detection. 
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CHAPTER 3   
Discrimination of DDoS Attack and Flash Crowd 
In this chapter, we aim to differentiate DDoS attack flows from flash crowds. We are 
motivated by the fact that the feature of traffic volume in flash crowds is different 
from DDoS attacks. Therefore, the flow similarity among flash crowds is much 
stronger than that among DDoS attack flows. We employ abstract distance metrics, 
the Jeffrey distance, the Sibson distance, and the Hellinger distance to measure the 
similarity among flows to achieve our goal. We compared the three metrics and found 
that the Sibson distance was the most suitable for our purposes. We applied our 
algorithm to real datasets and the results indicate that the proposed algorithm can 
differentiate the DDoS attack with high accuracy. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
It is a difficult challenge to identify DDoS attacks when hackers mimic the normal 
Internet traffic pattern or hide attack flows in legitimate traffic. Because of the 
vulnerability of the Internet, it is easy for hackers to spoof source IP addresses of 
attack packets [49], and verify the pattern of attack flows [9, 50], etc. In general, 
DDoS detection methods include activity profiling [15, 51], sequential change-point 
detection [52-55], wavelet analysis [56], and chi-square/entropy detector [51, 57]. All 
these methods are based on the features or fingerprints of specific DDoS attacks. 
Unfortunately, it is very easy for hackers to mimic these features to fool user detection 
methods. For example, because of the open architecture of the Internet, hackers can 
spoof the source IP addresses of attack packets according to real Internet IP address 
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distribution and use this against our source address distribution based detection 
algorithms [58, 59]; hackers can change the TTL value of attack packets according to 
the real hop distance between zombies and the victim respectively in order to use this 
against our hop-count detection methods [59, 60]. In order to fly under the radar, 
attackers may also mimic the behaviours of flash crowds [54, 61], or mimic a sudden 
increase in legitimate traffic, e.g. many fans will access an official website when an 
important match is happening or many people will check the CNN website when 
breaking news. 
DDoS attacks and flash crowds share similar behaviours, and we need to differentiate 
these effectively to avoid raising false alarms. In fact, it is a big challenge for 
defenders to discriminate between DDoS flooding attacks and flash events [54, 61, 
62]. There are serious consequences if we cannot do this. On one hand, attackers can 
mimic the traffic features of flash crowds to disable our detectors. On the other hand, 
our detectors may treat legitimate flash crowds as DDoS attacks. 
We are motivated by the fact that DDoS attacks and flash crowds have different 
traffic flows features. The DDoS attack flows are generated aggressively and 
simultaneously by the pre-built programs. This is because the intention of DDoS 
attacks is to perform the dysfunction of the available service at the victim, thus attack 
sources must synchronously generate the attacks. However, legitimate flash-crowd 
flows hesitantly increase in arrival packets observed at the server’s side. This is 
because flash crowds come from a rise in demand events of human interests such as 
breaking news, new promotions, campaigns, or sports events. Therefore, self-
similarity among flash crowds is much higher than among DDoS attack flows. 
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In this chapter, we employ three abstract distance metrics, the Jeffrey distance, the 
Sibson distance, and the Hellinger distance [63] to measure the similarity among 
network flows. A flow is defined as the packets which are passing a router with 
packets sharing the same destination address. When a DDoS alarm is raised, we start 
to sample the suspicious flows, and measure the similarity among the flows using the 
previously mentioned metrics. If the distance among the flows is sufficiently small, in 
other words, they are similar enough, we claim them as flash crowds. Otherwise, it is 
a DDoS attack flow. 
The major contributions of this chapter are as follows: 
− We present three distance measure metrics, and found that the Sibson metric is 
the best for our purpose of discrimination. 
− The proposed strategy is scalable and practical. The cooperating routers can be 
any routers on the Internet, rather than with an ISP network or a community 
network. We can perform our detection with only two cooperative routers on 
the Internet, which is much easier to achieve. The attack packets may be 
discarded well before they reach the victim according to the proposed 
methodology. 
− The proposed method is independent of any specific DDoS flooding attack 
tools. Therefore, it can actively detect any forthcoming new attack fashions. 
− The proposed algorithm is tested on real datasets, and we can differentiate 
DDoS flooding attacks from flash crowds with a high expectation of accuracy. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the background 
of flash crowds and the research that is related to this chapter. In Section 3.3, we 
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define the problem and specify our goal. Section 3.4 then explains the three metrics 
for distance measurement and the design of the discrimination algorithm. The 
performance analysis of the three metrics is conducted in Section 3.5, as well as the 
real dataset experiments for the proposed algorithm. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes 
this chapter. 
 
3.2  Background and Related Work 
3.2.1 Background 
A flash crowd (FC) is a phenomenon that occurs when a service catches the attention 
of a large number of network users. In a normal situation of web services, the service 
requests from legitimate users do not harm the server or service. However, a busy 
server could suffer a FC event which is observed as a sudden high demand in service 
requests from network users. The surging requests dramatically raise the use of 
computational and memory resources as well as causing traffic congestion at the 
server’s side. 
Flash crowds create suspicious flows similar to DDoS attacks. With a significant rise 
in network traffic, an FC event could overwhelm a server and create a similar DoS 
condition which results in either a delay of response or a complete crash. The 
consequences are very serious if we cannot discriminate between flash crowds and 
DDoS attacks. On the one hand, attackers can mimic the traffic features of flash 
crowds to confuse and disable a DDoS detection system. On the other hand, the 
detection system may treat the legitimate flash crowds as DDoS attacks which 
accelerate the DoS condition to the server. However, flash crowds have a number of 
different features from DDoS attacks. 
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− The intention of a request generation between a flash crowd and DDoS attack 
is different. Flash crowds, which are from legitimate network access and 
request, intend to access and derive a service from a server. For example, in a 
flash crowd event, many sport fans access the official website when an 
important sports match happening or many people check CNN website when 
breaking news occur [64]. Therefore, the server has to perform its function by 
maintaining availability and handling its legitimate requests during flash 
crowd events. In contrast, DDoS attacks create illegitimate packets with the 
intention of interrupting and disrupting the availability of the server. For 
example, the Storm worm compromised 85,000 machines and created DDoS 
attacks by sending 3 billion spam emails a day against a number of anti-spam 
websites [35]. This means the server has to handle a large number of 
illegitimate requests as well as dispose of a large number of malformed 
requests. 
− The feature of traffic volume in flash crowds is different from DDoS attacks. 
In flash crowd events, the traffic flow increases gradually to reach its peak and 
then decreases gradually to it normal traffic state. These traffic behaviours are 
dependent on human interests. For example, the spreading of news raises 
people’s attention to a particular service during a period of time. In contrast, 
DDoS attacks generate attack traffic aggressively to reach its traffic peak, then 
decreases sharply to its normal traffic state, which is controlled by an attacker. 
For example, a large number of compromised zombies send large traffic 
volumes to the victim server simultaneously and then stop this attack to hide 
from a traceback and possible investigation. 
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− The distribution of source IP address from flash crowds is also different from 
DDoS attacks. In flash crowd events, the source IP addresses of users are 
similar to each other. If those source IP addresses are categorised from an IP 
subnet-mask, a small number of subnets may contain of many source IP 
addresses. This is because the users of a server have a low geographical 
distribution, therefore, the distribution of source IP addresses is also low. In 
contrast, the source IP addresses from DDoS attacks have a high distribution. 
This is caused by spreading attack sources which could be anywhere around 
the world. Thus, the subnets of these attack sources consist of few source IP 
addresses.  
3.2.2 Related Work 
Previous research [62] has attempted to use three dimensions to discriminate flash 
crowds from DDoS attacks: traffic patterns, client characteristics and file reference 
characteristics. Unfortunately, this counter attack method cannot keep up with the 
ever changing methods of attack, as attack patterns also change from time to time, and 
an attacker may mimic network traffic patterns of flash crowds, causing the detector 
to be quickly disabled. The entropy detector mentioned [51] can raise an alarm for 
crowd access, however, it cannot discriminate DDoS attacks from a surge in 
legitimate accesses, e.g. flash crowds. Reference [54] tried to separate flash crowds 
from DDoS flows using the change-point detection method, but this method can be 
easily cheated, e.g. zombies can increase the number of attack packets very slowly, 
which will almost surely disable the change point detectors. 
Some research has been done on trying to solve the similarity problem using 
stochastic methods in the frequency domain [65, 66]. Cheng et al. [65] mapped DDoS 
attacks from the time domain to frequency domain, and then transformed it to power 
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spectral density to identify the DDoS attacks. Spectral analysis [67] employed a 
digital signal processing method to expose the hidden shrew DDoS attacking packets. 
Reference [66] used data mining technology to find DDoS attack information, 
however this is costly in terms of computing and delay. Our previous work [68] 
started to explore similarity methodology, and the effectiveness of this proposed 
method has been confirmed. Reference [69] used the Hellinger distance to detect 
VoIP floods in peer-to-peer networks. 
 
3.3  Problem Statement 
We consider a very simple network diagram shown as Figure 7, which could be any 
part of the Internet under control or cooperation of defenders. There are three routers, 
21, RR and 3R , and two traffic flows pf  and qf , which go through router 2R and 3R  
respectively, with the flows merging at router 1R . The dash lines in the diagram mean 
the routers may not have connected with each other immediately. In other words, the 
routers were probably separate and some distance apart. 
 
R2 
 fq 
fp 
Server
 
R3 
R1 
 
Figure 7 A sample network with two traffic flows 
Let )(xp  and )(xq  represent the flow probability distribution of flow pf  and qf , 
respectively, and χ  be the finite sample space for the flows. Moreover, )(xp  and 
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In this chapter, our goal is to measure the similarity among the flows, for example pf  
and qf  in Figure 7, and to differentiate DDoS attack flows from flash crowds. 
 
3.4  Design of Discrimination Algorithm 
3.4.1 Metrics for Distance Measures 
We discuss three metrics for distance measurement of network traffic flows based on 
the literature in this section. There are two categories in this kind of measurement: a) 
measurement based on information theory, and b) measure of affinity [63]. For 
category a), the original measurement is called the Kullback-Leibler distance [70]. For 
the two given flows with probability distributions )(xp and )(xq , the Kullback-
Leibler distance is defined as follows: 
∑
∈
⋅=
χx xq
xp
xpqpD )(
)(log)(),(      (1) 
Where χ  is the sample space of x . It is obvious that ),(),( pqDqpD ≠ , if
)()( xqxp ≠ . As a result, the previous equation cannot be a measure. The Jeffrey 
distance fixes this asymmetry using a combination of the Kullback-Leibler distance, 
which is defined as follows: 
)],(),([
2
1),( pqDqpDqpDJ +=      (2) 
A further measurement for this category is the Sibson distance detailed as follows. 
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The category b) originally came from Bhattacharyya’s measure of affinity, 
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distance, which is defined as follows: 
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It is necessary that we choose the most suitable metrics for specific purposes, e.g. 
measuring the similarity among network flows to discriminate DDoS attack flows. 
3.4.2 Discrimination Algorithm 
In this section, we detail the design of the discrimination algorithms. When there is a 
surge of network flows, we are unsure whether it is a DDoS attack or flash crowd, 
therefore, we name the surge flow as suspicious flows at the moment, with the 
cooperating routers activating the discrimination algorithm to take the decision 
further. 
Once the discrimination process is activated, the cooperating routers start to sample 
the suspicious flows for a sufficient time slot t, and the sampling is repeated until 
there are sufficient samples to make decision. The cooperative routers, e.g. router 2R
and 3R  in Figure 7, will exchange data when the sampling process is complete. The 
routers can then independently calculate the similarity of the flows using any one of 
the previous mentioned metrics (we use the Sibson distance in this chapter). If the 
distance is smaller than a given threshold, then the flows are flash crowds, otherwise, 
they are DDoS attack flows. The discrimination algorithm is detailed as in Figure 8. 
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Procedure: 
01: Identify the suspicious flow, , on a router i (i>1), and initialise sample slot t, sample 
size n, and the discrimination threshold . 
02: Take samples on flow  until the sample size , therefore, we obtain samples of 
number of packets as . 
03: Router i obtains its probability distribution of the flow as
 
, 
noted as .  
04: Router j obtains its probability distribution of the flow as , noted as
. 
05: Exchange  and  between router i and j. 
06: The distance between  and  is calculated at router i and j independently using 
the Sibson distance metric, and noted as . // can change to the nominated 
distance metric. 
07: If , it is a DDoS attack and discard the related packets; otherwise 
forward the packets to the destination. 
08: Go to step 02 
  
Figure 8 The discrimination algorithm. 
 
3.5  Performance Analysis on Metrics 
3.5.1 Metric Performance Analysis 
In order to find out which metric is the most suitable one for flow similarity 
measurement of DDoS attacks, we carefully conducted a number of simulations. In 
general, people believe that Internet traffic obeys the Normal distribution pattern or 
the Poisson distribution pattern. Moreover, any distribution can also be represented by 
the combination of a series of normal distributions with different parameters. 
Therefore, we examine the attributes of the three metrics using Normal distribution 
and Poisson distribution, respectively. There are two critical attributes that we use to 
compare the metrics: accuracy and sensitivity. 
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We arrange two flows with Normal distribution, 1,10 == σµ , with the three distance 
metrics applied to these two flows to measure the information distance. The 
simulation is conducted for 100 times, and the results are shown in Figure 9. We also 
performed the same simulation on two Poisson distribution flows with 10=λ , with 
the results shown in Figure 10. 
For two flows to share the same distribution and parameter(s), the distance between 
them is supposed to be zero in terms of statistics. From Figure 9 and Figure 10, we 
discovered that the Sibson’s information radius is the better metric in terms of 
accuracy. 
In order to examine the metrics’ sensitivity to traffic flow variations, two more 
simulations have been performed. We first investigated the metrics’ sensitivity against 
standard variations of Normal distribution flows with 10=µ and σ  varying from 0.1 
to 3.0, or namely 1% to 30% variation from the mean. The results are shown in Figure 
11.  
For the Poisson flows, we examined the metric sensitivity against the arrival rate, 
which varied from 5 to 12. The results are shown in Figure 12. 
Based on Figure 11 and Figure 12, we found that the Sibson’s information radius was 
the least sensitive metric among the three metrics. The simulations demonstrated that 
it was quite stable for the change of parameters in both the standard variation of 
Normal flows and the arrival rate of Poisson flows. 
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Figure 9 The measurements of two normal flows ( 1,10 == σµ ) 
 
Figure 10 The measurements of two Poisson flows ( 10=λ ) 
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Figure 11 The metric sensitivity of normal flows ( 10=µ ) against standard deviation 
 
 
Figure 12 The metric sensitivity of Poisson flows against arrival rate 
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3.5.2  Performance Evaluation of the Discrimination 
In this section, we examine the performance of the proposed discrimination algorithm 
against the real datasets. We use the NLANR PMA Auckland-VIII dataset [71] as the 
flash crowd, and the MIT LLS DDOS 1.0 intrusion dataset [72] as the DDoS attack 
dataset. For each dataset, we counted the number of packets, which were addressed to 
the server (for flash crowds) or the victim (for DDoS attacks), with the sample 
interval as 100 ms, and the size of samples begin 200. 
We processed the flows with the three metrics; the Hellinger distance, the Jeffrey 
distance, and the Sibson distance respectively. The results are shown in Figure 13, 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 respectively. Table 3 details the results of the similarity 
measurement by the three distance metrics based on Figure 13, Figure 14 and Figure 
15 respectively. In our experiment, we concluded two preliminary findings: 
− The Hellinger distance, the Jeffrey distance, and the Sibson distance can 
discriminate DDoS attack flows from flash crowds with 85% accuracy with the 
thresholds (δ ) of 0.025, 0.0015 and 0.00025 respectively. 
− The three distance metrics have the same ability in similarity measurement but 
are different in their threshold values in order to maximise the accuracy of the 
discrimination system. 
 
Table 3 Results of similarity measurement 
Distance Metric Threshold (δ ) False Positive False Negative Accuracy 
Hellinger 0.025 10% 20% 85% 
Jeffreys 0.0015 10% 20% 85% 
Sibson 0.00025 10% 20% 85% 
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Figure 13 Similarity measure with the Hellinger distance 
 
 
Figure 14 Similarity measure with the Jeffrey distance 
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Figure 15 Similarity measure with the Sibson distance 
 
3.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, we proposed a discrimination algorithm to differentiate DDoS attack 
flows from flash crowds by employing information distance to fulfil the task. We 
presented three metrics for information distance measures; the Jeffrey distance, the 
Hellinger distance, and the Sibson distance. Our simulations indicate that the Sibson 
distance is the least sensitive but the most stable metric among the previously 
mentioned metrics. Moreover, we maximised the accuracy of our discrimination 
system by adjusting the threshold values of the three distance metrics. The results of 
adjustment show these three distance metrics have the same ability in similarity 
measurement which can identify DDoS attacks from flash crowds with an accuracy of 
85% in the real dataset experiments.  
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CHAPTER 4  
DDoS Detection: A Predictable Behaviour of Attack 
Sources 
In this chapter, we propose behaviour-based detection algorithms that can 
discriminate a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack traffic from legitimate 
traffic regardless of the various types of attack packets and methods. Current DDoS 
attacks are carried out by attack tools, worms and botnets using different packet-
transmission rates and packet forms to beat defence systems. These various attack 
strategies lead to defence systems requiring different detection methods in order to 
identify the attacks. Moreover, DDoS attackers can craft traffic like flash crowd 
events and fly under the radar through the victim. We noticed DDoS attacks have 
repeatable patterns that are different from legitimate flash crowd traffic. In this 
chapter, we propose a comparable detection method based on the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient. Our methods can extract repeatable features from the packet 
arrivals in DDoS traffic but not in flash crowd traffic. The extensive simulations were 
tested for the optimisation of detection methods. We then performed experiments with 
several datasets and our results confirmed that the proposed methods can differentiate 
DDoS attacks from legitimate traffic. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Current DDoS attacks remain a significant threat to IT security on the Internet. 
Attacks can be carried out by attack tools [72], worms [73], and botnets [74] with 
many variants of attack packet transmission such as TCP/SYN, UDP and HTTP 
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request floods [75]. These sources of DDoS attack are powerful and can overwhelm 
any online host and server. Moreover, one of the biggest challenges for DDoS attack 
detection is a flash-crowd attack. A flash-crowd attack [75] occurs when there is a 
high volume of illegitimate packets from attack sources. The attack traffic is viewed 
in the same way as traffic with a high volume from legitimate users called flash 
crowd). Attack sources pretend to be real users and pump a large volume of request 
packets that flood the targeted victim. In this case, the defence/detection system may 
be beaten and the server has difficulty surviving the attack which causes it to crush or 
downgrade the service.  
Statistical-based defence systems [51, 59, 76, 77] are weak from crafted information 
when a DDoS attack occurs. This approach relies on header information from IP 
packets such as IP address, time-to-live (TTL), and protocol type (port number), etc. 
The detection can discriminate “normal” traffic from “abnormal” traffic which is 
more likely to be an attack. However, some botnets, e.g. Mydoom [73] can bypass 
detection approaches through the victim. This is because approaches consider the 
Transport layer and/or Network layer. Therefore, botnets which generate similar 
legitimate HTTP packets can avoid detection. Even though the attacking HTTP traffic 
is aggregated, they still look like a flash crowd.  
Heuristic-based defence systems [42, 64, 75, 78] against DDoS attack confront the 
problem of threshold adjustment. These approached may need to calculate its own 
threshold to judge the current observation traffic. The similarity, distance, 
classification, clustering and/or prediction analysis may be applied this research area. 
In contrast to the statistic-based approach, the heuristic-based approach does not need 
to learn/define the normal situation before making a comparison to an anomalous 
situation. The drawback of the heuristic detection approach is its inability to consider 
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legitimate traffic mixed with attacking traffic. Hence, packets from legitimate users 
may be blocked or eliminated during attack incidents. In addition, the threshold of this 
approach needs to be optimised when deployed to a DDoS defence system. 
In this chapter, we propose a solution to detect the pattern behaviour of traffic sources 
by observing packet arrivals. Since attack sources have been programmed and work 
according to their attack functions, pattern detection based on their behaviours is also 
possible. The worms work as an automatic program which can be differentiated from 
human users. The botnets and DDoS attack tools work as a semi-automatic program 
after an attacker issues the attack command based on C&C fashion. Hence, these 
attack sources could repeatedly generate attack packets with different transmission 
abilities. These anomaly behaviours may be predictable and explainable in pattern 
styles. In contrast, the arrival rate based on human users, including a proxy, server 
seems to constitute the nonpatternable (random) cases.  
Our proposed technique derives from Pearson’s correlation coefficient which is an 
effective method to discriminate packets among DDoS attack sources and real users 
including proxies. We propose two methods using the correlation to measure the data 
of packet arrival from an individual suspicious source with the result being either a 
dependent or independent relationship. The predictable (patternable) features seem to 
be stronger in dependent relationship of the data. The unpredictable (nonpatternable) 
data tended to be in the independent relationship. Since we can measure the degree of 
pattern behaviour, we can push the right actions to the right packets. The packets from 
the attack sources must be eliminated, but the user packets must get through the 
server. 
The contributions of this chapter are listed as follows: 
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• Reliability: Our detection methods caused low false positive and false negative 
in the results. By using the measurement of a statistical relationship between the 
two sets of flow data, we can expect the result to be highly accurate. 
• Feasibility: Our detection methods may be implemented in real-world cases 
based on current Internet technology. With the light calculation and low 
complexity, it is possible the proposed methods could be implemented in 
various kinds of network equipment such as hubs/switches, firewalls, routers 
and IDS. 
• Real-time implementation: Our detection methods are able to detect DDoS 
attacks in a short period of time. Fast detection would benefit a defence system 
because the action response could be performed as soon as the suspicious flash-
crowd traffic arrives at the server.  
• Flexibility: Our detection methods may be able to detect any form of attack 
packets such as malformed IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, and Application-based floods. 
Our detection methods also work well with a periodic attack with low traffic 
volume. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the background 
and related works of our research. Section 4.3 states the problem and defines the 
methods to solve the problem. Each method will be discussed in detail with the 
adjustment of thresholds and variables in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 uses the adjusted 
threshold and variables to experiment with the publicly available datasets from the 
real traces. In the final section, we provide the summary and discuss about the 
direction of our research in the future. 
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4.2  Background and Related Work 
4.2.1  Background 
Our proposed approach to discriminate DDoS attack traffic from user traffic is to 
observe the packet transmission rate. An individual host may require access to a 
service from a server by sending a request. The request packets can be, for example, 
TCP/SYN, or HTTP requests, etc. Hence, the request packet transmission can be 
observed using the degree of automation, as we know attack sources work following 
the instructions from the programmer and have a very high degree of automation to 
work through after instructions are issued. When the attack sources perform a DDoS 
attack on the victim, their transmission rate appears to be predictable and itself 
becomes a pattern in a short period of time. However, Internet users have a limited 
time for the response from the outcome after his/her requests. For example, after a 
webpage has been shown, the user may take time to skim and respond, for example, 
clicking on a link. In other words, human users as well as proxies unpredictably create 
request packets at any period of time. Hence, we can test the pattern of packet 
transmission by using some mathematical models or statistical analysis. 
As we know, attack rates depend on the characteristics of packet transmission. From 
the victim-end perspective, the attack packets received can be observed as an arrival 
rate. This attack behaviour can be divided into two main types. There are: 
a) Predictable rate: The attack sources send out the attack packets in a 
predictable way to the victim. For instance, if we have enough data from a 
packet arrival at the time interval, we would know what is going to occur at the 
next time interval. This is important behaviour from an attack source, which is 
an automatic program, because the program follows the instructions from the 
(malicious) programmer. For example, the botnet program usually repeats 
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packet transmission until other commands are issued. There are various arrival 
rates (attack rates) and they can be classified as follows: 
− Constant rate [14, 77] can be considered a stable attack rate. The attack 
agent (botnet) may use a constant attack rate that may be considered from 
the available bandwidth, the performance of a computer, and so forth. With 
a low bandwidth rate, the attack can fly under the radar and get through the 
defence system. Therefore, this attack can disturb and/or reduce the quality 
of services until a denial of services occurs that depends on the aggregate 
rate at the victim site. In cases of DDoS attack, the attack agents may 
continue sending the attack packets to the victim with maximum available 
bandwidth and full ability for transmission which may destroy the victim’s 
service. When a large number of agents flood a huge number of attack 
packets simultaneously, the vulnerable victim will be overwhelmed and 
unable to serve legitimate client requests. In a worst case scenario, the 
victim’s servers can completely crash. 
− Increasing rate [14, 77] can be considered a linear or an exponential attack 
rate and is also known as an abrupt rate attack. The attack agent may 
increase its packet transmission rate gradually or dramatically. As a result, 
the victim’s resources are either slowly or rapidly exhausted. A slowly 
increasing attack rate can delay sensory detection of an attack. The attack 
agent, however, may increase the attack rate to maximum or decrease its 
attack rate at a later stage. 
− Periodical rate [67, 77, 79] generates a predictable attack rate. The attack 
agents may not continue the same attack rates, but may repeat transmission 
behaviour of attack packets as a regular pattern. A periodical rate attack is 
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also defined in a Pulsing DoS attack which considers period of the attack 
(T), length of the peak (L), and magnitude of the peak (R) [8, 9]. 
b) Unpredictable rate: The variable rate attack (or fluctuating rate attack) [14] is 
varying the transmission rate of attack packets to avoid detection and response. 
To generate an unpredictable attack rate, the attack agents may randomise the 
transmission rate and the attack delay time for the attack packets. The attack 
could be generated in a continuous and/or discontinuous traffic style. The 
detection system may allow this type of attack to pass through victims because 
it appears as flash-crowd traffic, which is in high demand by legitimate 
Internet users. 
4.2.2 Related Work 
In order to create a DDoS defence system, the DDoS detection system plays an 
important role to secure the availability of services. With various methods for 
detecting DDoS attacks, there are several survey papers [39, 49, 80] that classify the 
existing methods. In general, we can classify the detection mechanisms into 
statistical-based and heuristics-based methods based on detection algorithms.  
A statistical-based detection system (SBDS) determines normal traffic/packet data 
and then generalises the scope of normal. The traffic/packets that fall outside this 
scope are judged as anomalous (or attack). The process of an SBDS is to learn and 
analyse patterns of continuous network traffic. To improve accuracy, SBDS needs to 
learn traffic with constant patterns as much as the SBDS can be active on the network. 
Network traffic/packet information is processed with complex statistical algorithms. It 
differentiates anomalous traffic/packets from normal patterns of established network 
traffic. All traffic/packets are measured by an anomaly score for the specific event and 
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if the score is higher than a defined threshold, the detection system will give a further 
action to the anomalous traffic/packets.  
A heuristic-based detection system (HBDS) employs algorithmic logic from statistical 
analysis of the network traffic on which to base their threshold decisions. HBDS 
requires fine tuning to adapt to network traffic and minimise the false 
positives/negatives. Because heuristics are fallible, it is important to understand their 
limitations. Their intention is to be of assistance in order to make quick estimates and 
preliminary process designs. 
While the key to any SBDS is its ability to learn and distinguish normal from 
anomalous network activity, the HBDS relies on optimisation of its threshold 
decision. DDoS detection with SBDS relies on header information from IP packets 
such as IP address, time-to-live (TTL), and protocol type (port number). The detection 
can discriminate normal traffic, from abnormal traffic which is more likely to be an 
attack. However, some botnets, e.g. Mydoom [73] can bypass detection approaches 
through the victim. This is because the approaches consider the Transport layer and/or 
Network layer. Therefore, the botnets which generate similar legitimate HTTP 
packets can avoid detection, and even though the attacking HTTP traffic is 
aggregated, they still look like a flash crowd. 
HBDS against DDoS attack relies on an adjustable threshold. Each approach may 
need to calculate its own threshold to judge the current observing traffic. The 
drawback of heuristic detection approaches is their inability to consider legitimate 
traffic that is mixed with attacking traffic. Hence, packets from legitimate users may 
be blocked or eliminated during attacks. In addition, HBDS also consumes 
computational resources such as CPU and memory. This is an important consideration 
when planning to deploy HBDS. 
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Source-based packet filtering [59] defines the defence scheme against various source 
IP address spoofing. The novel method is based on source IP addresses and TTL, and 
follows some statistical patterns that compare non-attacking and attacking periods, 
then divides the source IP addresses into n (1≤n≤32) segments. This statistic-based 
detection works independently at the potential victim’s side, and there is no 
requirement for cooperation among routers in the defence scheme. This could benefit 
on storage space and speed of information retrieval for the potential victims.  
Xie and Yu [76, 77] created DDoS detection architecture for monitoring Web flash-
crowd traffic in order to reveal dynamic shifts in normal bursts of traffic, which might 
signal the onset of application-layer DDoS (App-DDoS) attacks during a flash crowd 
event. The proposed method is based on principal component analysis (PCA), 
independent component analysis (ICA), and hidden semi-Markov model (HsMM). 
The Access Matrix (AM) is designed to capture spatial-temporal patterns of a normal 
flash crowd. The entropy of document popularity fitting to the model is used to detect 
potential App-DDoS attacks. The experiment could differentiate App-DDoS attack 
modes (i.e., constant rate attacks, increasing rate attacks and stochastic pulsing attack) 
from a flash crowd event. When the detection threshold of entropy is set as µ±3σ, the 
detection rate (DR) is 91.08% and FPR is 1.78%. The model was also tested based on 
user browsing behaviour. When the detection threshold of entropy is set as µ±3σ, the 
DR is 97.90% and the FPR is 1.80%. However, the AM needs to learn the pattern of 
“normal” legitimated traffic and the threshold of entropy needs to be adjusted to 
maximise DR and minimise FPR.  
An anomaly detection system [42] deploys Support Vector Machine (SVM) in order 
to create a learnable algorithm. The detection is implemented for classification and 
deploys the Dynamically Growing Self-Organising Tree (DGSOT) algorithm for 
  
64 
 
clustering analysis. The approach was compared with the Rocchio Bundling technique 
and random selection in terms of accuracy loss and gain in training time. While the 
SVM + DGSOT accuracy rate is very low (69.8%), the training time is long (13.18 
hours), the false negative rate (FNR) is very high (37.8%), as is the false positive rate 
(FPR)at 29.8%. 
Human-vs.-bot differentiation [75] by human behaviour modelling was proposed with 
an adjustable threshold. The approach derives the three aspects of human behaviour: 
1) request dynamics, 2) request semantics and 3) ability to process visual cues. The 
evaluation processes are based on a series of web traffic logs, interlaced with 
synthetically generated attacks. This heuristic approach could discover the flash-
crowd attacks hidden in the test traffics with high accuracy (around 95-99%). The 
adjustable threshold of 0.05 gives a low FNR (0.00%) and low FPR (1.94%). 
Chonka, Singh and Zhou [78] deploy the theory of network self-similarity to 
differentiate DDoS flooding attack from legitimate self-similar traffic in the network. 
A neural network detector was developed for training by a DDoS prediction 
algorithm. When the threshold of sensitivity has a range of 88% to 94%, FPR is also 
very low with a range of 0.05% to 0.45%. 
In the previous chapter, we created a heuristic-based DDoS discriminator from flash 
crowd traffic. We nominated distance metrics (the Jeffrey distance, the Sibson 
distance, and the Hellinger distance) to measure the similarity among flows. We 
compared the three metrics and found that the Sibson distance is the most suitable one 
for our purposes as it differentiates DDoS attacks from a flash crowd with an accuracy 
of around 85%. 
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4.3  Problem Statement 
We consider the situation where a server is overwhelmed by flash crowd flows and/or 
DDoS attacks as illustrated in Figure 16. A server connects to the Internet and 
provides a service to public Internet users. Legitimate users do not harm the server or 
the service. However, the busy server may suffer a flash crowd (FC) event which is 
observed as a sudden high demand in service requests from Internet users. A flash 
crowd could overwhelm a server and create a DoS condition which results in either a 
delay of response or a disappearance of service.  
A DDoS attack is, however, more harmful than a flash crowd (represented as FC1, 
FC2 and FC3 in Figure 16). Zombie machines or bots (represented as Z1, Z2 and Z3 
in Figure 16) are compromised and controlled by attackers. The (botnet) attacks can 
be synchronised to overwhelm the victim (represented as Server in Figure 16) during 
a specific period of time. The situation may worsen when a flash crowd merges with a 
DDoS attack as shown in Figure 17. This accelerates the DoS condition to the server. 
As a result, other users (represented as U1, U2 and U3 in Figure 16) are unable to 
access the service. 
The behaviour of the bot can be detected by the victim’s server side by observing the 
predictable arrival rate. To minimise the cost of calculation, the server can observe the 
arrival rate (λk) from a high risk group of users. A study [74] found that in a botnet 
attack scenario, at most around 30% of bots were online at the same time during 
attack activities. This could possibly be an approximate number of IP addresses that is 
needed to run a check on bot behaviour. In particular, only 30% of user IP addresses 
that express high arrival rates can be checked in a given period of time. This chapter 
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covers only two methods using the correlation coefficient to check arrival rates as 
data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 A sample server environment 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 Accumulative arrival rate λ (packet/time interval) from k source IP address(es) 
 
4.3.1 Mathematical Models 
Based on data from arrival rates, we need mathematical models to identify the degree 
of prediction. Since we categorise data into predictable and unpredictable data, the 
mathematical models must be able to judge the data by using a threshold. These 
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possible models are the tools for self-similarity analysis such as the correlation 
coefficient and distance matrix. In this chapter, we use Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient (here after called the correlation) [81], which is defined as: 
,  	 
  
  																																																																												5 
The correlation is used to measure dependence between two quantities (variables) X 
and Y with expected values µX and µY and standard deviations σX and σY. Both the 
value of the standard deviations are finite and nonzero (0 < σX < ∞ and 0 < σY < ∞). 
One of the impressive properties of the correlation is symmetric measurement 
(,  ,). In other words, whichever data comes first, we can still achieve the 
same result as measuring.  
The correlation value is between -1 and 1(
1  ,  1). Hence its absolute value 
(|,|) cannot exceed 1. The absolute correlation value is 1 |,|  1, which is 
represented by the stronger relationship between two variables called linear 
dependence. However, the absolute value from the correlation may reach zero 
|,|  0, but this does not always mean the two variables are uncorrelated. In a 
special case where both are normal, the uncorrelated result is also equivalent to 
independence. In our research, we define the data that gives us this value of 1 
(|,|  1) as predictable data with a linear form. The absolute correlation value of 0 
(|,|  0) also defines predictable data with a symmetric form. 
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4.3.2 Methodology Algorithms 
a) Method 1: Correlation between arrival rate and sequence number. 
 
Figure 18 Algorithm of Method 1 
 
As described in Figure 18, we denote X as a sample set of an arrival rate (	 
, where k = 0, 1, 2, … , N) and Y as a sample set of sequence numbers (Y  
where k = 0, 1, 2, … , N). For example, 	  , 	, 	, … ,  and  
0, 1, 2, … , . Then, we calculate the correlation value (,) from the two 
variables, X and Y. The value that we expect is between -1 and 1 (
1  ,  1). 
 
Inputs:  !": The sample set of arrival rate ": The sample set of sequence number // sample data 
t: The period of time for packet arrivals // by default t = 0.1 second 
MAX_K: The maximum number of sample data 
MAX_I: The maximum number of sample correlation 
Output:  #$: The set of correlation coefficient 
Procedure: 
01: Let MAX_K = 20 // by default 
02: Let MAX_I = 10 // by default 
03: Let k = 0, i = 0 
04: For each i Until MAX_I 
05:  For each k Until MAX_K 
06:  !" = number of arrival packets during time t 
07:  X[k] = !" 
08:  Y[k] = k 
09: k Increases 1 
10:  Calculate #%,& // using Equation (5) 
11:  #$ = |#%,&| // absolute value of correlation 
12:  i Increases 1 
13:  Let k = 0 // reset k for the next loop i 
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b) Method 2: Correlation of self-arrival rate. 
As described in Figure 19, we denote X as a sample sequence of an arrival rate 
(	  , where k = 0, 1, 2, … , N) and Y as a sequence number of the time 
interval (  ' where k = 0, 1, 2, … , N). For example, X = {λ0, λ2, λ4, …, 
λ(2k)} and Y = {λ1, λ3, λ5, …, λ(2k+1)}. Then we calculate the correlation value (,) 
from the two variables: X and Y. The value that we expect is between -1 and 1 

1  ,  1. 
 
Figure 19 Algorithm of Method 2. 
Inputs:  !"	: The sample set of arrival rate (even no. data) !"'(	: The sample set of arrival rate (odd no. data) 
t: The period of time for packet arrivals // by default t = 0.1 second 
MAX_K: The maximum number of sample data 
MAX_I: The maximum number of sample correlation 
Output:  #$: The set of correlation coefficient 
Procedure: 
01: Let MAX_K = 10 // by default 
02: Let MAX_I = 5 // by default 
03: Let k = 0, i = 0 
04: For each i Until MAX_I 
05:  For each k Until MAX_K 
06:  !" = number of arrival packets during time t 
07:  X[(k/2)] = !" 
08: !"'( = number of arrival packets during next time t 
09:  Y[(k/2)+1] = !"'( 
10: k Increases 2 
11:  Calculate #%,& // using Equation (5) 
12:  #$ = |#%,&| // absolute value of correlation 
13:  i Increases 1 
14:  Let k = 0 // reset k for the next loop i 
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Figure 20 Threshold of Decision Making 
 
4.3.3  Threshold Algorithm 
For both methods we calculate the correlation value and define two thresholds: upper 
threshold (τU) and lower threshold (τL). We can calculate these thresholds as follows: 
)* 	  + ∗ 1.0																																																																																																		6 
). 	  1.0 
 + ∗ 1.0																																																																																			7 
As shown in Figure 20, the value of the upper threshold must not exceed 1 but should 
less than the lower threshold (1 0	τU 0	τL). On the other hand, the value of the lower 
threshold must not be below 0, but should be greater than the upper threshold (τU	0	τL 
0 0). The confidence value + is another adjustable value that we will discuss in the 
next section. As we stated in our goals, these thresholds will help us to identify the 
degree of dependency on the arrival rate data and allow us to put these into two 
categories: 
a) Predictable attack rate: The data will be classified as a predictable attack rate 
if the correlation value is close to 0 or 1 as we discussed in the previous 
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section. If the absolute correlation value is less than the lower threshold 
(0  |,|  τL), or greater than the upper threshold (τU  |,|  1), the 
data is judged as a predictable attack rate. However, we still need to define 
how close the correlation value can be for it to be considered a dependency 
arrival rate. This issue will be explained in more detail in the next section. 
b) Unpredictable attack rate: The data will be classified as an unpredictable 
attack rate if the correlation value is not close to 0 or 1. In other words, the data 
is expressed as a non-attack arrival rate and is legitimate to the service of the 
server. If the absolute correlation value is between the lower and upper 
thresholds (τL 1 |,| 1 τU), the data is judged as a unpredictable attack rate. 
However, we still need to define the range of the correlation value that can be 
judged as an independency arrival rate. This issue will be explained in more 
detail in the next section.  
  
Unfortunately, only one correlation result (,) is unable to determine whether the 
arrival data is attacking or legitimate. We need a series of correlation results to 
confirm this situation. Hence we define 2 is a set of the consecutive results of the 
correlation coefficient. The i variable (i = 0, 1, 2, … , N) could be the limited number 
observing the correlation value. For instance, if we want to observe the correlation for 
10 values, we will have , , , … , 3. Each of the correlation values will be 
calculated with the upper (τU) and lower threshold (τL) to define whether the data is 
predictable or not. All of these results will be calculated for a number of predictability 
points (P) and then the average predictability point 45 respectively. We can then 
identify the traffic as an attack or a legitimate flow as shown in Figure 21. Finally, we 
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decided to only drop the IP traffic that expressed repeatable features, which is an 
indication of the predictable traffic. For more details about the above variables, we 
provide a discussion with value analysis in the next section. 
 
Figure 21 Algorithm of making a decision by thresholds. 
 
4.4  System Optimisation Analysis 
In this section, we discuss optimising variables. As we proposed in our goals, the 
attack detection system must respond as quickly as possible after the attack reaches 
Inputs:  #$: The set of correlation coefficient 
m: The size of sequence number // sample correlation data 
τU: The upper threshold // using Equation (6) 
τL: The lower threshold // using Equation (7) 
Output:  
Sample of arrival data !" contains either predicable attack or not. 
Procedure: 
01: Let P = 0 
02: For each #$ Until m  // using Equation (8) 
03:  Case 1: |#$| 0	τU) OR (|#$| 	τL) 
04:  The ith set of arrival data !" is dependence 
05:  P increases 1 // 1 point 
06:  Case 2: (|#$| 1 τU) AND |#$| 6 τL) 
07:  The ith set of arrival data !" is independence 
08: Calculate 7  // using Equation (9) 
09: If 7  () Then  // identify as an attack traffic 
10:  The arrival data !" is predictable 
11:  Drop packets from this IP address 
12: Else  // identify as an legitimate traffic 
13:  The arrival data !" is unpredictable 
14:  Pass packets from this IP address 
15: End 
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the victim. The computational resources also need to be minimised with simplified 
methods. To find the optimised variables, we analysed the following: 
4.4.1  Size of Sample 
We begin from size (k) of a sample set of arrival rates (, where k = 0, 1, 2, … , 
N). The question is how much sample data should be used? If the size is very small, 
for example k = 3, the calculation process is very quick. However, the correlation 
result (,) may be misleading. As a result, the performance measurement gives us a 
high rate of false negatives/positives. On the contrary, if the size is quite large, for 
example k = 100, the calculation process is very slow. This also means we wait for a 
long period of time to obtain all sample data 
, 	, 	, … , 33. For example, if each k has a time slot of 0.1 seconds. Our 
defence system needs at least 10 seconds to obtain the first sample correlation 
coefficient (). Moreover, if we observe up to 10 sample correlation data 
, , , … , 3, the detection will give us the result in at least 11 seconds (10 
seconds for the first correlation data (), plus 1 second for the remaining data 
, , 8, … , 3). This delay in making the decision means a weak victim may have 
an increased chance of crashing. 
4.4.2 Correlation Thresholds and Confidence Value 
There are two thresholds we consider in minimising the false positive/negative rate: 
the upper threshold (τU) and lower threshold (τL). To catch predictable attacks, we 
need to adjust the absolute correlation value to be greater than the upper threshold (τU 
 |,|  1) or less than the lower threshold (0  |ρ9,:|  τL). The question arises 
what the best values for τU and τL are. If we adjust τU too high and τL too low, our 
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detection system may fail, and as a result, the defence system may allow most attack 
packets to get through. On the contrary, if we adjust τU too low and τL too high, we 
may confront the DoS condition earlier because most packets would be considered a 
predictable attack. Since the two thresholds are important, the adjusted values may 
rely on how much confidence we have. Hence, the confidence value + would be 
calculated using these thresholds. By default, we assign the confidence value of 85% 
(+  0.85). Thus, the τU is 0.85 of the correlation value and τL is 0.15 of the 
correlation value. 
4.4.3 Predictability point 
Before the final decision on the detection system is made, the predictability point (P) 
is a variable that needs to be discussed because it would be assigned based on the 
result of each correlation 2. Because the correlation result may be close to 0 or 1 
(, → 	0	OR	, → 	1), we need to transform this result into a marking score 
fashion. In case of predictable data, if the correlation value is not lower than the upper 
threshold (τU), or is not higher than the lower threshold (τL), we then set P = 1. In case 
of unpredictable data, if the correlation value is between the upper threshold (τU) and 
the lower threshold (τL), we then set P = 0. 
4  ?1,				if	)B  |	,| 1	or	0  |	,|  )E0,				otherwise																																										K 																														 8 
The final step is to judge whether or not the arrival data  is a predictable attack 
from the average predictability point (4). The 4 is calculated from the total 
predictability point divided by the total number (m) of observing correlation (2) as 
below:  
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4 	  1L M 4N
O
NP 																																																																																															9 
The question is how much m should be used. If the number of consecutive correlation 
values is very small, for example m = 2, the calculation process is very quick. 
However, the 4 may be misleading. As a result, the performance measurement gives 
us a high rate of false negatives/positives. On the contrary, if the number of 
consecutive correlation values is quite large, for example m = 20, the detection 
process is very slow. It also means we wait for a longer time to obtain all the data 
4, 	4, 	4, … , 43, for example, if each k = 10 has a time slot of 0.1 seconds. Our 
defence system needs at least 1.0 second to get the first sample correlation coefficient 
(). If we observe up to 20 consecutive correlation data (, , , … , 3), we 
need to do calculations for 20 predictability points 4, 	4, 	4, … , 43. The 
detection then gives us the result in at least 2.9 seconds (1.0 second for the first 
predictability point (4) plus 1.9 seconds for the remaining data 4, 	4, … , 43. This 
delay in making the decision means a weak victim may increase their probability of 
crashing. 
By default, we assign the total number of observing correlation to 5 (m = 5). 
However, we strongly advise the collection of 100% of predictability points to detect 
the predictability feature of the data. This means that the average predictability points 
must equal 1 (4  1.0). Otherwise, we define the data as unpredictable. 
4.4.4 Generated Dataset Analysis 
We may optimise all the variables from the experiment on generated datasets. The 
datasets illustrate the samples of scenarios that may help us to discover the suitable 
value for those variables. To help us achieve this we first generated two datasets: 
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random linear and peak curve as depicted in Figure 22(a) and Figure 24(a) 
respectively. Secondly we captured some part of the real datasets that expressed the 
screw attacks. 
In the generated dataset 1, we assume in the scenario that the attack source slowly 
increases the attack rate, which delays the detection of an aggressive rate. Figure 22(a) 
depicts the straight relationship between data sequence number and arrival rate in 
method 1. Figure 23(a) depicts the straight relationship between the arrival rate itself 
in method 2. 
Dataset 2 assumes the scenario that the attack source slowly increases and then 
decreases the attack rate creating a peak form which is able to delay the detection of 
an aggressive rate. Figure 24(a) depicts the symmetry-peak relationship between the 
data sequence number and the arrival rate in method 1. Figure 25(a) depicts the 
straight relationship between the arrival rate itself in method 2. For each generated 
dataset, we tested the two methods and compared their results. Based on the theory, 
our generated datasets must give us the result as predictable data. This means that 
each dataset may give us a close correlation value of zero or one (, →
	0	RS	, → 	1). 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 22 Experiment on generated dataset 1(exponential line) with method 1, (a) packet 
arrival plot, (b) accumulative correlation, and (c) correlation from different k 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 23 Experiment on generated dataset 1(exponential line) with method 2, (a) packet 
arrival plot, (b) accumulative correlation, and (c) correlation from different k 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 24 : Experiment on generated dataset 2 (peak) with method 1, (a) packet arrival plot, (b) 
accumulative correlation, and (c) correlation from different k 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 25 Experiment on generated dataset 2 (peak) with method 2, (a) packet arrival plot, (b) 
accumulative correlation, and (c) correlation from different k 
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4.5 Optimisation of the Results 
Optimisation is an important step in maximising our detection performance. We begin 
with the calculation of the accumulative correlation and the correlation with different 
k values. All generated datasets were tested to find the proper k as a default k value for 
all other real datasets. The proper k value links to the proper thresholds and 
confidence value. The results of the generated datasets are as follows: 
4.5.1 Generated Dataset 1 (Linear Increasing Attack) 
For the result of accumulative correlation in Figure 22(b) and Figure 23(b), both 
methods provide excellent results with a higher confidence value of more than 
95%	+ 6 95%. This means the results of the correlation 2 are between 0.95 and 
1.00 (0.95 0 2 0 1.00), which is higher than the upper threshold (τU). Hence, this 
scenario can apply to any size (k) of the sample data without misleading information 
about the correlation. However, we have to test for different sizes (k) of sample data 
to be sure. 
For the results of correlation from different sizes (k) of the sample data, both methods 
had different capabilities to judge the results. In method 1, the lower size (k) sample 
data was selected when there was a higher degree of misleading information about 
correlation. With k = 5 and k = 10, only 64% and 89% of the sample data can be 
judged as predictably linear. With k = 20, we can confidentially confirm that this data 
is predictably linear. On the other hand, we can also use method 2 with any k of more 
than 5 and achieve confidence of at least 95% with which to determine this data as 
predictably linear. Hence, in the case of a linear relationship, method 2 seems more 
closely identifies the relationship and provides more accuracy than method 1. 
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4.5.2  Generated Dataset 2 (Peak Curve Attack )  
For the result of accumulative correlation, both methods give us very different results. 
Method 1 gives us results of correlation 2 varying between 0 and 1. These results 
will be confusing when we try to distinguish predictable behaviour. However, method 
2 gives the confidence value + up to 99%, which is higher than the default 
confidence value. Hence, this scenario can apply method 1 to any size (k) of sample 
data without providing misleading information about correlation. To be absolutely 
positive about this we need to test for different sizes (k) of the sample data. 
For the result of correlation from different sizes (k) of the sample data, both methods 
provide different avenues to judge the results. In method 1, we found that the higher 
the degree of misleading information about correlation, equated to the selection of a 
larger size (k) of the sample data. With k = 10 and k = 20, only 91% and 80% of 
sample data respectively can be determined as predictably linear. With k = 5, we can 
confirm that 97% of this data is predictably linear. On the other hand, if we use 
method 2 with any k more than 10, and we achieve confidence of at least 95% to 
determine the data as predictably linear. Hence, in the case of a linear relationship, 
method 2 more closely identifies the relationship and provides more accuracy than 
method 1. 
However, we do not calculate too much arrival data because this process is costly. 
Only 20 continuous correlation values would be enough to judge whether the arrival 
data is either predictable or unpredictable. If the average predictability point 45 of 
one part of the arrival data expresses predictable behaviour, we can then proceed with 
further actions such as dropping packets. 
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4.6  Evaluations 
We tested our methods with the generated datasets and analysed how to optimise all 
variables in our discrimination detection system. However, we were unable to use all 
details of the test due to the number of results. Based on the real datasets, we tested 
these with optimised variables using both methods. The following examples are 
provided with a description: 
 
Table 4 List of initial variables. 
Experiment Method 1 Method 2 
Time interval 0.1 second 0.1 second U 85% 85% 
τU / τL 0.85 / 0.15 0.85 /0.15 
k 20 10 
m 10 5 
 
 
4.6.1 Sample Dataset 1 (WC55) 
WC55 is an example of clients from a website of the World Cup 98 [82]. Its arrival 
rates are similar to screw attacks as depicted in Figure 26(a). However, our belief is 
that this may not be a screw attack but an automatic program. Perhaps, this is an effect 
of using Java script to update data from the website.  
Now if we consider the results of correlation from both methods, accumulative 
correlation provides us with very different meanings. Method 1 detects the traffic flaw 
as an attack with a confidence value of 94% (as shown in Figure 26(b)), but the other 
method does not (as shown in Figure 27(b)). In this case, we must rely on the method 
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that can detect the relationship of dependence, and therefore we will not consider 
correlation with k = 10 from method 2. 
As we have stated, method 1 is more reliable in this scenario. The accumulative 
correlation is more stable and less than 0.05 after k > 20. Hence, we consider k = 20. 
As a result, the maximum average predictability point (4) is 0.80, if +  95%. 
Because we set the confidence value too high, this scenario did not detect whether it 
was a screw attack. 
The system administration may ignore this kind of low attack rate which may not 
harm to the service system. Perhaps this was a downloaded program or Java scripts 
that regularly download HTTP objects from the website. However, if we consider it as 
an automatic program, we could reset +  85% and then the system could detect an 
attack after 30 time intervals (equal to 3.0 seconds). 
4.6.2 Sample Dataset 2 (MIT17060) 
MIT17060 is sample traffic of the client from the MStream attack project [72]. Its 
arrival rates are transmitted in random mode and are hard to detect as shown in Figure 
28(a). As this is a high arrival rate, we expected our method to detect it as soon as 
possible before it could harm the server. 
If we consider the result of correlation from both methods as shown in Figure 28(b) 
and Figure 29(b) respectively, the accumulative correlation tells us something similar; 
method 1 and 2 detect the traffic as an attack with 85% of the confidence threshold 
value. As a result, the maximum average predictability point (4) is 1.00, if +  85%. 
In regards to the detection time, the two methods can detect the attack within 1.7 
seconds and 2.4 seconds respectively. 
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4.6.3 Sample Dataset 3 (WC1387) 
WC1387 is an example of the clients from the World Cup 98 website [82]. Its arrival 
rates are transmitted like a flash crowd as depicted in Figure 30(a). As this is a high 
arrival rate, we expected our method to detect this flow as legitimate flash crowd 
traffic with a low degree of harm to the server. 
Now let us consider the results of correlation from both methods. The result of 
accumulative correlation as shown in Figure 30(b) and Figure 31(b) tells us a similar 
meaning; method 1 and 2 could not detect a strong relationship for the traffic flow 
with 85% of the confidence threshold value. As a result, the maximum average 
predictability point (4) is only 0.10 and 0.60 from both methods respectively, if 
+  85%. This is because the traffic is clean and therefore, all attack request data 
passes through the server. 
 
Table 5 Comparison of detection results. 
Dataset 
Detection result (Best Detection Time) 
Method 1 Method 2 
WC55 Attack (3.0 seconds) Non-Attack 
MIT17060 Attack (1.7 seconds) Attack (2.4 seconds) 
WC1387 Non- Attack Non-Attack 
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(a)  
 
(b) 
Figure 26 Experiment on sample dataset 1 (WC55) with method 1, (a) packet arrival plot, and 
(b) correlation from k = 20. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 27 Experiment on generated dataset 1 (WC55) with method 2, (a) packet arrival plot, 
and (b) correlation with k = 10. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 28 Experiment on sample dataset 2 (MIT17060) with method 1, (a) packet arrival plot, 
and (b) correlation from k = 20. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 29 Experiment on sample dataset 2 (MIT17060) with method 2, (a) packet arrival plot, 
and (b) correlation with k = 10. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 30 Experiment on sample dataset 3 (WC1387) with method 1, (a) packet arrival plot, 
and (b) correlation from k = 20. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 31 Experiment on sample dataset 3 (WC1387) with method 2, (a) packet arrival plot, 
and (b) correlation with k=10. 
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As we previously mentioned, DDoS attack sources have a form of pattern behaviour 
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patterns. Moreover, we tested these methods with generated data and real-trace 
datasets from the website of the World Cup 98 and MStream attack project. We found 
hidden predictable behaviour from both datasets. The best results we achieved were 
1.7 seconds and 2.4 seconds from the first and second method respectively. We can 
also differentiate flash crowd traffic from DDoS attack traffic. The detection 
performance so far was good enough to protect the server from crashing during a 
DDoS attack incident. We believe that our experiment is a significant step to 
providing universal DDoS detection which could be implemented on any network 
equipment or any Internet layer.  
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CHAPTER 5  
Smart DDoS Detection: A Learning Algorithm with 
LDA 
In this chapter, we propose an effective approach with a supervised learning system 
based on Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) to discriminate legitimate traffic from 
DDoS attack traffic. Currently, there is a wide outbreak of DDoS attacks that remain 
risky for the entire Internet. Different attack methods and various attack strategies are 
trying to challenge DDoS defence systems. Among the behaviours of attack sources, 
repeatable and predictable features differ from legitimate sources of traffic such as 
humans and Internet proxies. In addition, the DDoS defence systems lack the learning 
ability to fine-tune their accuracy of detection results. This chapter analyses real trace 
traffic from publicly available datasets with triple checks of repeatable patterns on 
attack sources. Pearson’s correlation coefficient and Shannon’s entropy are deployed 
for extracting dependency and predictability of traffic data respectively. Then Linear 
Discriminant Analysis (LDA) is used to train and classify legitimate and attack traffic 
flows. From the results of our experiment, we can confirm that the proposed 
discrimination system can differentiate DDoS attacks from legitimate traffic with a 
high rate of accuracy. 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Today, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are serious threats to computer 
hosts on the Internet. A recent report [6] has revealed the largest attack size doubled 
year after year, to more than 100 Gbps, which is a surprising 1000% increase in attack 
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size since 2005. The attacks can be carried out by a large number of compromised 
hosts, called zombie armies. These hosts become the attack tools associated with 
performing DDoS attacks and are the reason why legitimate users experience a 
decline or absence of their service. Moreover, mimicking DDoS attacks [78] place 
more pressure on the defence system to differentiate attacks as opposed to legitimate 
flows (flash crowd). On an individual attack source, the packet transmission is crafted 
in a random fashion. This method helps the attack traffic fly under the radar through 
the victim.  
Research on DDoS detection has been able to identify DDoS attack packets and/or 
traffic flows. In addition to the detection of common attacks, DDoS detection uses 
statistical and behavioural analysis methods to identify attacks in progress. While, the 
key to any statistical-based detection system (SBDS) [59, 76, 77] is its ability to learn 
and distinguish normal from anomalous network activity, the heuristic-based 
detection system (HBDS) [42, 75, 78, 83] relies on optimisation of its threshold 
decision. Moreover, HBDS needs fine-tuning to produce stability, and improve results 
of anomaly detection in network traffic and minimise false positives/negatives. This 
configuration process needs manual and semi-automatic adjustment for its threshold. 
Hence, creating an autonomous DDoS detection system with a learning algorithm is 
still a mystery in this research area. 
As we follow the assumption from the previous chapter, the action of a DDoS attack 
source follows the instructions programmed by an attacker. Its function is repeatable 
to generate and transmit DDoS attack packets to the reflector/victim. As a repeatable 
feature from the attack source, the repeatable behaviour is apparently different from 
the behaviour of a human user or an Internet proxy. Since we can catch the repeatable 
feature of an attack source, we can measure the degree of predictability in the 
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behaviour of packet transmission. Unfortunately, we are unable to detect this 
repeatable feature closer to the attack source from the side of the victim. Hence, we 
could measure their behaviours by observing the packet arrivals instead. The rate of 
packet arrivals may be moderately altered from the original rate of packet generation 
during the process of packet transmission from the source to the destination. 
However, we can be successful in measuring the predictability feature by using the 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient and Shannon entropy. We can also 
classify these features into two groups (attack and legitimate) by Linear Discriminant 
Function as we will explain later in the next section.  
In this chapter, we propose a solution to discriminate DDoS using the supervised 
learning model from the pattern behaviour of traffic sources by observing packet 
arrivals. This proposed technique is an effective method to discriminate packets 
among DDoS attack sources and legitimate users including human users and proxies. 
The packet arrival rate is detected as measurement data to differentiate attack-source 
traffic from legitimate traffic. We have doubled the measurements of pattern 
behaviour from Pearson’s correlation and the Shannon entropy. Since we can measure 
the degree of pattern behaviour, we can classify the suspicious flows into either 
legitimate flow or attack flow by Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA). The flows 
from the attack sources must be filtered out but legitimate flows must get through the 
server. 
The contributions of this chapter are listed as follows: 
• Reliability: Our DDoS discrimination system maximises the accuracy in 
detecting and minimising a false positive rate (FPR) and a false negative rate 
(FNR) in the results. By using the triple check from Pearson’s correlation, the 
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Shannon entropy and LDA, the statistical relationship of a traffic flow is 
measured a high rate of accuracy. 
• Feasibility: Our DDoS discrimination system could be implemented in real-
world cases based on current Internet technology. With light calculation and low 
complexity, the proposed methods are feasible to be implemented in many kinds 
of network equipment such as hub/switches, firewalls, routers, IDS and IPS. 
• Early detection: Our DDoS discrimination system is able to detect DDoS 
attacks in any part of the network route from the packet source to the server. 
This increases chance of implementing it as a cooperative security networks. As 
soon as the suspicious flash-crowd traffic arrives at the system, we can use an 
alarm to alert the server in the early stage. 
• Flexibility: Our DDoS discrimination system could detect any form of attack 
packets such as malformed IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, Application-based floods, etc. 
Our detection methods also work well with low-rate attacks, flash-crowd 
attacks, shrew attacks, periodical attacks, and pulsing attacks. 
• Ability to Learn: Our DDoS discrimination system may be enhanced to learn the 
classification based on its knowledge. Since we have measurement decision 
modules to provide a double check for the accuracy of results, the knowledge 
from feedback can be reused by the training algorithm. Hence, the amendable 
knowledge is supervised to the classification module and maximise the 
accuracy. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the background 
and the related work of our research. In Section 5.3, we summarise the mathematical 
tools related to our research. Section 5.4 discusse
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the specific challenges these raise. In the next section, we propose a solution with the 
system modelling. In Section 5.6, we provide the results of our experiment with 
publicly available datasets. In the final section, we provide a summary of this chapter. 
 
5.2 Background and Related Work 
5.2.1  Background 
A DDoS attack is an anomalous incident when a server is overwhelmed by a large 
volume of accumulative/simultaneous packet flows. When a server is connected to the 
Internet and overwhelmed by huge suspicious flows, these flows may be a flash 
crowd and/or a DDoS attacks as illustrated in Figure 16. In a normal situation, 
legitimate users do not harm the server or the service. However, a busy server could 
suffer a flash crowd (FC) event which occurs when there is a sudden high demand in 
service requests from Internet users. A FC could overwhelm the server and create a 
similar DoS condition which results in either a delay of response or a complete crash. 
A DDoS attack is, however, more harmful than a FC (represented as FC1, FC2 and 
FC3). Zombie machines or attack sources (represented as Z1, Z2 and Z3) are 
compromised and controlled by attackers, while a botnet attack can be synchronised 
to overwhelm the victim (represented as Server in Figure 16) during a specific period 
of time. The situation may be worse when a flash crowd merges with a DDoS attack. 
This accelerates the DoS condition for the server. As a result, other users (represented 
as U1, U2 and U3) are unable access to the service. 
In our proposed approach, DDoS traffics will be discriminated from legitimate traffics 
by observing the packet arrival rate. When the attack sources perform a DDoS attack 
on the victim, their arrival rates appears to be pr
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[83]. However, Internet users have a limit on packet generation for their response to 
the Internet application [75]. For example, after a webpage has been shown, the user 
may take time to view and respond, for example, clicking on a link. In other words, 
human users unpredictably create request packets at any period of time. Therefore, we 
can discriminate the pattern of packet arrivals by using certain mathematical models 
or statistical analysis. 
Our approach has no limitation on the types of attack packets or attack methods. The 
attack packets can be in many forms such as falsified IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, and 
Application-layer packets [75]. We also made sure that our approach handled various 
attack methods such as a constant rate attack [77], an increasing rate attack [77], a 
flash-crowd (FC) attack [75], a low-rate (LDoS) attack [84], a Reduction-of-Quality 
(RoQ) attacks [9, 85], a periodical attack, a shrew attack [67, 85], a pulsing attack [77, 
84]) and more importantly, a mimicking attack [78]. 
5.2.2 Related Work 
Both a heuristic-based detection system (HBDS) and a statistical-based detection 
system (SBDS) have their limitations. While, the key to any SBDS is its ability to 
learn and distinguish normal from anomalous network activity, the HBDS relies on 
optimisation of its threshold decision and requires fine-tuning to produce stability, 
improvement, or precise results of anomaly detection in network traffic. It also relies 
on optimisation to minimise the false positives/negatives. 
An anomaly detection system [42] deploys Support Vector Machine (SVM) and 
Dynamically Growing Self-Organising Tree (DGSOT) in order to create a learnable 
algorithm and deploy a clustering analysis respectively. The approach was compared 
with the Rocchio Bundling technique and random selection in terms of accuracy loss 
  
99 
 
and training time gain. SVM + DGSOT achieve the learning system for DDoS 
detection, however, the results are very low in accuracy (69.8%), very long in training 
time (13.18 hours), very high in its false negative rate (FNR) (37.8%), and very high 
in its false positive rate (FPR) (29.8%). 
Human-vs.-bot differentiation [75] by human behaviour modelling was proposed with 
adjustable threshold. This approach derives three aspects of human behaviour: 1) 
request dynamics, 2) request semantics and 3) the ability to process visual cues. The 
evaluation process was based on a series of web traffic logs, interlaced with 
synthetically generated attacks. This heuristic approach discovered the flash-crowd 
attacks hidden in test traffics with a high accuracy (around 95-99%). The adjustable 
threshold of 0.05 gave a low FNR (0.00%) and low FPR (1.94%). 
A DDoS detection based on Chaos Theory [78] deploys the theory of network self-
similarity to differentiate DDoS flooding attack from legitimate self-similar traffic in 
the network. In the experiment, the authors developed a neural network detector for 
training by the DDoS prediction algorithm. When the threshold of sensitivity had a 
range of 88% to 94%, FPR varied with a range of 0.05% to 0.45%. 
In the previous chapter, we implemented an approach to discriminate attack traffic 
from a flash crowd. The detection can extract the repeatable features in a DDoS attack 
flow with rapid performance. However, we confronted problems differentiating when 
the attack flow was in mimicking (random) form, as this is similar to a flash crowd. 
 
5.3 Mathematical Models 
Based on data from arrival rates, we need mathematical models to identify the degree 
of prediction. Since we categorise data into predictable and unpredictable data, the 
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mathematical models must be able to judge the data by using a threshold. These 
possible models are the tools for self-similarity analysis such as the correlation 
coefficient and distance matrix. In this chapter, we deploy Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient, Shannon Entropy and Linear Discriminant Analysis as detection and 
discrimination tools. 
5.3.1  Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient 
In this chapter, we select a feature that can measure the degree of dependence in data 
by using Pearson’s correlation coefficient [81] (here after called the correlation), 
which is defined as: 
,  	 Σ	,   	 
  
  																																																											10 
The correlation is used to measure dependence between two quantities (variables), X 
and Y with expected values µX and µY and standard deviations σX and σY. Both value of 
the standard deviations are finite and nonzero (0 < σX < ∞ and 0 < σY < ∞). One of the 
impressive properties of the correlation is symmetric measurement (,  ,). In 
other words, whatever data comes first, we can still achieve the same result as 
measuring.  
The correlation value is between -1 and 1(
1  ,  1). Hence its absolute value 
(|,|) cannot exceed 1. The absolute correlation value is equal 1 |,|  1 
represented by the stronger relationship between the two variables called linear 
dependence. However, the absolute value from the correlation may reach zero 
|,|  0. This mean the two variables are uncorrelated. In a special case where 
both are normal, the uncorrelated result is also equivalent to independence. In this 
chapter, we define the data that gives us this value of 1 (|,|  1) as predictable 
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data with a linear form. The value of 0 (|,|  0) defines unpredictable data in 
linear form. 
5.3.2  Shannon Entropy 
We select another feature that can measure the degree of uncertainty in data by using 
Shannon entropy (here after called the entropy), which is defined as: 
W	  	 
 M XY2 log XY2\2P 																																																																					11 
The entropy is a measure of uncertainty/unpredictability for a random variable 
	  Y2 ∶ ^  1, 2, 3, … , ` where XY2 is the probability mass function of outcome 
Y2. The entropy value is between 0 and log ` 0  W	  log `. The entropy value 
is equal 0 W	  	0 represented by the high predictability of the random variable 
	. However, the entropy value could reach its maximum value W	  log ` if the 
random variable 	 is high in uncertainty/unpredictability. In this chapter, we define 
the data that gives us an entropy value of 0 W	  	0 as predictable data. On the 
contrary, the value of maximum entropy W	  log ` defines unpredictable data. 
5.3.3  Linear Discriminant Analysis 
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) is a statistical approach in classifying objects 
(people, things, events, etc.) based on theirs sets of features that can be placed in two 
or more characteristic groups. A feature must be defined as an observation, property, 
attribute, variable or measurement of an object. In the training process, groups are 
known or predetermined and do not have order (i.e. nominal scale). A feature set of 
those objects is then measured which helps to solve the classification problem. 
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For classification of g groups, the Bayes' rule [86] could minimise total errors by 
assigning the object to group i which expresses the highest conditional probability 
against group j: 
4^|Y 6 4a|Y	, bcd	∀	a f ^																																																																		12 
However, we cannot achieve the probability 4^|Y of the class directly from the 
given measurement of the object. We can obtain the measurement and compute the 
probability for each class by knowing 4Y|^ as given in the Bayes Theorem [87]: 
4^|Y  4Y|^. 4^4Y  4Y|^. 4^∑ 4Y|a. 4a∀N 																																																						13 
Thus, the Bayes’ rule (Equation 13) becomes: 
4Y|^. 4^∑ 4Y|. 4∀ 6 4Y|a. 4a∑ 4Y|. 4∀ 	 , bcd	∀	a f ^																										14 
We can simplify the Equation 14 as follow: 
4Y|^. 4^ 6 4Y|a. 4a, bcd	∀	a f ^																																												15 
We assign the object to group i if the proposed formula (Equation 15) is satisfied. If 
we have multiple classes and multiple dimensions of measurement, with each 
dimension having many values, the computation of conditional probability 4Y|^ 
requires a large amount of data. In general, we assume that data comes from some 
theoretical distribution. In this chapter, we assume that the data comes from the 
multivariate Gaussian distribution [87] in the following formula: 
4Y|^  i 12j|Σ2|k lYX m

12 Y 
 2nΣ2oY 
 2p																															16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where, 2 is vector mean and Σ2 is the covariance matrix of group i. Replacing the 
distribution formula (Equation 16) into Bayes’ rule in Equation 15 creates a new 
formula: 
i 4^2j|Σ2|k lYX m

12 Y 
 2nΣ2oY 
 2p 6 
i 4a2jqΣNqk lYX m

12 rY 
 NsnΣNorY 
 Nsp , ^ f a																										17 
We can simplify Equation 17 by taking out 2jtu as follows: 
i4^|Σ2|k lYX m

12 Y 
 2nΣ2oY 
 2p 6 
i4aqΣNqk lYX m

12 rY 
 NsnΣNorY 
 Nsp , ^ f a																						18 
We can then take the natural logarithm from both sides of Equation 18: 
lnr4^s 
 12 ln|Σ2| 
 12 Y 
 2nΣ2oY 
 2 6	 
lnr4as 
 12 lnqΣNq 
 12 rY 
 NsnΣNorY 
 Ns, ^ f a																			19 
We simplify the Equation 19 by multiplying both sides with -2 and then reversing the 
inequality sign as follows: 
ln|Σ2| w Y 
 2nΣ2oY 
 2 
 2 lnr4^s 1 
lnqΣNq w rY 
 NsnΣNorY 
 Ns 
 2 lnr4as , ^ f a																				20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If all covariance matrices are equal (Σ  Σ2  ΣN), then Equation 20 is simplified as 
follows: 
Y 
 2nΣoY 
 2 
 2 lnr4^s 1 
rY 
 NsnΣorY 
 Ns 
 2 lnr4as , ^ f a																												21 
In Equation 21, we can rewrite the first term of each side as follows: 
YΣoYn 
 22ΣoYn w 2Σo2n 
 2 lnr4^s 1 
YΣoYn 
 2NΣoYn w NΣoNn 
 2 lnr4as , ^ f a																	22 
Finally, we multiply 
  for both sides of Equation 22, reversing the inequality sign 
and then simplifying the formula as follows: 
lnr4^s w 2ΣoYn 
 12 2Σo2n 6 
lnr4as w NΣoYn 
 12 NΣoNn , ^ f a																															23 
Denote that: 
b2  lnr4^s w 2ΣoYn 
 12 2Σo2n , ^ f a																											24 
By deriving Equation 23 and 24, we then have the Linear Discriminant Function: 
b2 6 bN ,				bcd	∀a f ^																																																															25 
We could assign object by measurement x to group i if Equation 25 is satisfied. In this 
chapter, we select the two features (data dependence (|,|) and data predictability 
(W	)) as a measurement x. Then we use LDA to train and classify measurement x 
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into two different groups based on its nature. We explain this in detail later in the 
following section. 
 
5.4 Problem Statement 
We considered the situation when a server derives by suspicious traffic flow via its 
router. As illustrated in 0, a server connects to the Internet and provides a service to 
public Internet users. In normal situation, the server can handle legitimate users with 
limited resources such as CPU processes and memory/buffer. However, a busy server 
could suffer a flash crowd (FC) event which is observed as a sudden high demand in 
service requests from Internet users. This FC event forces the server to work hard with 
its limited resources. The FC flow may also overwhelm the server and create a Denial 
of Service (DoS) condition which results in either a delay of response or a complete 
crash. Hence, the FC flow must be monitored and considered a suspicious flow when 
it arrives at the server. 
Since the flow could be either legitimate traffic and/or DDoS attack traffic, we treat 
the flow as suspicious flow, which has the potential to harm the server. The process of 
investigation and mitigation begins by taking a sample of the arrival rate (λk) of 
individual traffic from an individual source. Then we measure the degree of 
dependency and predictability of an individual flow. If the flow can be classified as a 
dependent and predictable flow, then it is an attack, as shown in Table 6. If the flow 
can be classified as an independent and unpredictable flow, then it is a legitimate flow 
of traffic. Otherwise, the flow remains unknown and is considered suspicious. 
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Table 6 Measurement of a sample flow 
Dependency Predictability Measurement 
True True Attack 
True False Unknown 
False True Unknown 
False False Legitimate 
 
5.5  System Modelling 
The goal of this chapter is to classify a suspicious flow into either legitimate or DDoS 
attack traffic. To satisfy this investigation process, the following system model (as 
shown in Figure 32) will be proposed: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32 Architecture of a traffic discrimination system 
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Decision Making 
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Table 7 List of initial variables 
Variable Correlation Entropy 
Time interval 0.1 second 0.1 second 
No. of sample 10 10 
 
 
5.5.1 Dependency 
In the process of dependency measurement of the arrival rate (λk), we nominate the 
correlation using Equation 10. We denote X as a sample set of arrival rate (	   ∶
  1, 2, 3, … , `), and Y as a sample set of sequence number (Y  ∶  
	1, 2, 3, … , `). For example, 	  , 	, 	8, … ,  and   1, 2, 3, … , . Then we 
calculate the correlation value (,) from the two variables (X and Y). The value that 
we expect is between -1 and 1 (
1  ,  1). Then we pass the dataset of absolute 
values of the correlation (|,|  ||, ||, |8|, … , ||:   1, 2, 3, … , `) to the 
process of Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA). 
5.5.2 Predictability 
In the process of predictably measuring the arrival rate (λk), we nominate entropy 
using Equation 11. We denote X as a sample set of arrival rate (	   ∶  
1, 2, 3, … , `). For example, 	  , 	, 	8, … , . Then we calculate the entropy 
value W	 from the variable (X). The value that we expect is between 0 and 
log ` 0  W	  log `. By default, we initial the number (N) of sample arrival 
rate to 10. Then we can expect the entropy to be between 0 and 1 (derived from 
log `  log 10  1). Finally, the dataset of the entropy 
(W	  W, W, W8, … , W:   1, 2, 3, … , `) is passed to the process of Linear 
Discriminant Analysis (LDA). 
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5.5.3 Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) 
In the process of LDA, we derive two features of the arrival rate (λk) which are 
processed by the correlation (|,|  ||, ||, |8|, … , ||:   1, 2, 3, … , `) and 
the entropy (W	  W, W, W8, … , W:   1, 2, 3, … , `) modules. Then these 
datasets are processed in one of the following phases: 
a) Training phase: One of the LDA processes is to let the discrimination system 
learns the classified (known) object category. We provide some samples from 
the DDoS attack datasets and legitimate FC dataset to the system. This is an 
important process for selecting the right training data for our discrimination 
system. Then the LDA will create its threshold for our system for the purposes 
of decision making. 
b) Classification phase: Since the discrimination system supervises the nature of 
data, it will have a general knowledge to classify the test data that we need to 
investigate. By using the LDA threshold ()), we can measure the accuracy of 
our system. 
In the process of LDA, we calculate the two features using the Linear Discriminant 
Function (Equation 25). If the coordinate results (bY  rb2, bNs: ∀^ f a) are in a 
training phase, this will create the threshold ()) for further evaluation measurement. If 
the coordinate results (bY  rb2, bNs: ∀^ f a) are in classification phase, they will 
be used to compare and classify the threshold. 
5.5.4 Measurement 
The approach of measurement against threshold ()) for the classification process is 
similar to the training process. However, the measurement data (Y) is tested against 
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the criteria of probability (4^) and the vector mean (2) of group i plus the 
covariance matrix (Σ) of all groups. We also tested the measurement data (Y) with 
group j as shown in Figure 33. Then the results were evaluated against the accuracy as 
shown in Table 8. 
Table 8 List of accuracy measurement 
y$ 6 yz	? Result Fact Accuracy 
True Group i Group i True Positive 
True Group i Group j False Negative 
False Group j Group i False Positive 
False Group j Group j True Negative 
  
 
 
Figure 33 Threshold of Decision Making 
5.5.5 Decision Making  
The module of decision making is based on the threshold ()) from the training 
datasets. As shown in Table 8 and Figure 33, if the measurement data (Y) satisfies 
b2 6 bN (Equation 25), then it is classified into group i. Otherwise, it is in group j. In 
this chapter, we classify group i and j as legitimate traffic and attack traffic 
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respectively. Finally, we inform the next module in order to generate a report of the 
measurement result.  
In the case of false detections increasing, this module gives us a double check from 
the previous and on-going behaviours for measurement data (Y). We are looking 
forward to developing a learning discrimination system using its feedback as shown in 
Figure 32. This advance technology could provide us with an artificial intelligence 
(AI) of a smart DDoS detection system. 
5.5.6 Security Report 
The last part of the discrimination is the module of the security report. After a 
decision has been made by the decision making module, then an action 
command/message is then generated to order/inform the security system. We are 
looking forward to customising this report generation and serving various types of 
intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention systems (IPS). 
 
5.6  Evaluation 
In order to measure the discrimination performance, we have to test 2 datasets from 
real traces (the World Cup 98 website (WC) [82] and the MIT project of MStream 
attacks (MIT) [72]). We took each sample flow from legitimate and attack traffic from 
these datasets for the training of our system. Then we took another traffic flows from 
each dataset to test processes of the classification and measurement. The results of the 
discrimination processes are: 
5.6.1 Results of Dependency 
The result of the dependency process derives from the measurement of the arrival rate 
(λk). We took the samples of the arrival rate (λk) from the 2 datasets. The experiments 
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were performed into 2 phases. In the training phase, we selected WC200657 and 
WC55 as a legitimate flow (group i) and an attack flow (group j) respectively. In 
classification phase, we select the WC1387 and MIT17060 as suspicious flows. We 
then calculated the degree of predictability for both datasets by using the correlation. 
As shown in Figure 34, the correlation values of these datasets have different degrees 
of dependency. While the WC55 seems to be stable with periodical change in its 
values, other datasets have varied degrees of dependency. With a high correlation 
value, the dataset is defined as a high degree of dependency which is linked to the 
repeatable feature of DDoS attack sources. Otherwise, the low correlation values 
define the dataset as a low degree of dependency, which is linked to unpredictable 
(random) behaviour of legitimate users. However, judging either legitimate or attack 
flow is not accurate enough when using a single method of correlation measurement. 
We then deliver all of the correlation values to the training and classification process 
in order to classify their groups based on the nature of data. 
 
 
Figure 34 Correlation plots of the datasets for training and classification phases 
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5.6.2 Results of Predictability 
The result of the predictability process derives from the measurement of the arrival 
rate (λk). We took the samples of the arrival rate (λk) from the 2 datasets. The 
experiments were performed into 2 phases. In the training phase, we selected the 
WC200657 and WC55 as a legitimate flow (group i) and an attack flow (group j) 
respectively. In the classification phase, we selected the WC1387 and MIT17060 as 
suspicious flows. We then calculated the degree of predictability for both datasets by 
using entropy. 
As shown in Figure 35, the entropy values of these datasets have different degrees of 
predictability. While the WC55 seems to be stable with periodical change in its 
values, other datasets have varied degrees of predictability. With a low entropy value, 
the dataset is defined as having a high degree of predictability which is linked to the 
repeatable feature of DDoS attack sources. Otherwise, high entropy values define the 
dataset as a low degree of predictability, which is linked to unpredictable (random) 
behaviour of legitimate users. However, judging either a legitimate or attack flow is 
not accurate enough by only using a single method of entropy measurement. We 
delivered all of these entropy values to the training and classification process in order 
to classify their groups based on the nature of the data. 
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Figure 35 Entropy plots of the datasets for training and classification phases. 
 
5.6.3 Results of Training LDA 
The result of the training process derives from the measurement data (Y) which is 
passed from the Dependency (correlation) and Predictability (entropy) modules. We 
selected the WC200657 and WC55 as a legitimate flow (group i) and an attack flow 
(group j) respectively, as depicted in Figure 36. Then, we trained the system to know 
their groups and create their own threshold as depicted in Figure 37 and Figure 38. As 
shown in Table 9, the training process can accurately discriminate between the 
legitimate and attack flows 100% of the time. This means that the calculated threshold 
is perfect for discriminating a legitimate flow from an attack flow in the early stages 
of the training process. 
We can also confirm the high performance of discrimination by the statistics in Table 
11 and Figure 39. The threshold gives us the equal average distance (1.327) between 
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the legitimate group and the threshold, and between the attack group and the 
threshold. Since we found a good threshold for our discrimination system, we expect 
this threshold to work well for the test datasets. 
 
Table 9 Result of training 
Accuracy Positive Negative 
True 100.0% 100.0% 
False 0.0% 0.0% 
 
 
Table 10 Result of classification 
Accuracy Positive Negative 
True 100.0% 92.3% 
False 0.0% 7.7% 
 
 
Table 11 List of LDA scores 
LDA Data Average Min. Max. 
Train Leg. 1.327 0.979 1.614 
Train Att. -1.327 -2.156 -0.750 
Test Leg. 1.142 0.273 2.089 
Test Att. -1.829 -4.306 0.670 
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Figure 36 Scatter plot of original data for training 
 
 
Figure 37 Scatter plot with threshold from the LDA training process 
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5.6.4 Results of Classification LDA 
The results of the classification process derives from the measurement data (Y) which 
is also passed by the correlation and entropy modules. We selected the WC1387 and 
MIT17060 as a legitimate flow (group i) and an attack flow (group j) respectively as 
depicted in Figure 40. We measured the accuracy of the classification process against 
the trained threshold as depicted in Figure 41 and Figure 42. As shown in Table 10, 
the classification process can accurately discriminate the legitimate flow 100% of the 
time. However, the attack flow can only be detected with a rate of 92% accuracy and 
a false negative of 7.7%. This means the legitimate flows has unique behaviour 
regarding unpredictable packet transmission as well as a high accuracy for detecting 
DDoS attack flow that can protect the system of the server. 
We can also confirm the high performance of discrimination by the statistic from 
Table 11 and Figure 43. The distance measurement gives us the absolute average 
LDA score (1.829) of an attack group that is higher than the absolute average LDA 
score (1.142) of the legitimate group. This means that the discrimination system has a 
high level of differentiation in the attack flow. 
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Figure 40 Scatter plot of the original data for classification 
 
 
Figure 41 Scatter plot with the threshold from the LDA classification process 
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Figure 42 Scatter plot with the 
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5.7 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, we proposed an effective approach with a supervised learning system 
based on Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) to discriminate legitimate traffic from 
DDoS attack traffic. With high efficiency in the deployment of LDA, we introduced a 
new LDA approach in this research area against DDoS attacks. This helps reduce the 
complexity and configuration of the discrimination system. In addition, this approach 
also adopted a method of detecting in human-based behaviour when browsing 
websites, which is a huge difference from predictable behaviour of DDoS attacks. 
This method could detect DDoS attacks regardless of the types of attack packets and 
transmission methods. 
Our discrimination system consists of 2 major stages. In the first stage, we need to 
perform training to provide some knowledge of the known groups of our 
discrimination system. We performed the experiment with famous trace datasets from 
the World Cup 98 website and MIT project of MStream attacks. We firstly setup two 
measurements which were the correlation and entropy to extract the features of data 
dependency and predictability respectively. Then, we injected these features into LDA 
as its measurement data. The result of this process was good enough to create its own 
effective threshold. At the final stage, we used the threshold from the previous process 
to classify the group as legitimate or attack flows. This classification process provides 
us with a total accuracy of 96.2%, with 100% accuracy in the detection of legitimate 
flows. 
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CHAPTER 6  
Web Privacy Protection:  
A Perfect Anonymity Approach on Web Browsing 
Anonymous web browsing is a topical subject at the moment as we are seeing an 
increasing number of events performed on the Internet. The dominant strategy of 
achieving anonymity is packet padding with dummy packets as cover traffic. 
However, this method introduces two inherent problems: extra bandwidth and extra 
delay. Therefore, it cannot satisfy both perfect anonymity and strict delay constraints 
of web browsing. In order to resolve these challenges, we propose a creative approach 
that uses the predicted web pages that users are going to access as cover traffic rather 
than dummy packets. Moreover, users may expect a trade-off between the degree of 
anonymity and cost. We therefore defined the anonymity level as a metric to measure 
the degrees of anonymity. We established a mathematical model for anonymity 
systems, and transformed the anonymous communication problem into an 
optimisation problem, and as a result, users will find trade-offs between the two 
contradictory constraints. Based on the model, we can describe and compare our 
proposal and the previous schemas in a theoretical style. We believe that this model 
offers a solid foundation for further research in this area. The preliminary experiments 
on the real dataset demonstrated the huge potential for the proposed strategy in terms 
of resource saving. 
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6.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to present an efficient and novel way for web browsing 
with perfect anonymity. Moreover, we will also focus on solving the contradictory 
constraints between high level anonymity and long delays in the applications for web 
browsing. Anonymous web browsing has become a hot topic recently because of the 
boom in Internet based applications, such as information retrieval, online shopping, 
and online voting. In order to meet the privacy needs of these kinds of activities, a 
number of anonymous systems have been proposed, implemented and used on the 
Internet, such as, mix and mix networks [88], Crowds [89], Onion Routing [90], and 
Tor [46]. The best solution for defenders is to design a system with perfect anonymity 
that which can never be breached in any condition. This is possible according to 
Shannon’s perfect secrecy theory (we use perfect anonymity to replace perfect secrecy 
in this chapter) [91], however, the cost of perfect anonymity is extremely high, and it 
may not be practical under certain constraints, for example, the delay constraint for 
web browsing. 
The anonymity issue of web browsing has been widely explored in recent years, with 
focus on various attacks and defences on the Tor system [44, 92-97]. Traffic analysis 
is the most powerful tool against anonymous communications. The traffic analysis 
attack includes two categories: profiling attack [98, 99] and timing attack [100-102]. 
Rather than obtaining the content of communication, adversaries who use traffic 
analysis attacks usually focus on whether two entities communicate with each other, 
which websites the target user accesses, and so on. They try to derive as much 
information as possible from traffic metadata, such as message lengths, number of 
packets, and packet arrival time intervals. In terms of a profiling attack, adversaries 
have a list of possible websites and already have the profiles. This means the task is to 
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find which websites the target user accesses. Timing attacks [100-102] based on the 
fact that low-latency anonymous systems, such as onion routing, do not introduce any 
delays or significantly alters the timing patterns of an anonymous connection. The 
time interval of arrival packets of HTML text and HTTP objects is usually similar for 
target users and their adversaries. If they access the same webpage, then it is easy for 
adversaries to figure out which website the target user accesses from the list. 
Researchers currently employ the dummy packet padding technique to fight against 
traffic analysis. Usually, dummy packets are injected into the intended network traffic 
to change the patterns or fingerprints of the actual traffic to achieve anonymity [103, 
104]. In order to disguise the timing information of connections, the packet rate of a 
connection should constantly be the same, which mean we need to add dummy 
packets when real traffic is low or idle, and on the other side, when the actual traffic 
rate is high, we have to drop some packets to be in alignment with the planed packet 
rate. This is called link padding [105-107]. Wright, Coull and Monrose [108] recently 
proposed a traffic morphing method to protect the anonymity of communication. This 
work is quite creative, however, it still uses a dummy packet padding strategy and 
requires extra network resources, such as bandwidth. 
The strategy of dummy packet padding [109] results in two major problems in 
communication: extra delay and extra bandwidth demand. These disadvantages are 
extraordinarily challenging in wireless, ad hoc, and sensor networks [103]. Because of 
the strict delay constraint from web viewers, a high level of anonymisation on web 
browsing may not always be achievable using dummy packet padding. 
In this chapter, we are motivated by these challenges and propose a novel strategy to 
resolve these challenges in web browsing. Our proposal comes from the fact that users 
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usually access a number of web pages at one website according to their own habits 
and interests, and this has been confirmed by the applications of web caching and web 
page prefetching technologies [110-112]. Therefore, we can use prefetched data to 
replace dummy packets for padding. This novel strategy fundamentally solves the 
problems of extra delay and extra bandwidth cost of packet padding. Moreover, our 
proposal makes it possible to achieve perfect anonymity of web browsing. 
The contributions of this chapter are summarised as follows. 
− We propose a novel strategy for packet padding using prefetched data as cover 
traffic for anonymous web browsing. The proposed strategy makes it possible 
to achieve perfect anonymity in web browsing under rigorous delay 
constraints. At the same time, the proposed schema can significantly reduce 
bandwidth waste and network delay. 
− We established a mathematical model to describe and analyse the 
anonymisation systems. We believe this model can be used for further 
research in this field. 
− We transformed the anonymous communication problem into an optimisation 
problem based on our model. As a result, we can figure out the tradeoffs 
between the anonymity level and the cost for applications. This makes it 
possible for users to find the best anonymity level once the delay constraint is 
known. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Related work and background are 
presented in Section 6.2. We finally set the problem up in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4, 
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we present the details of system modelling and analysis, followed by performance 
evaluation in Section 6.5. Finally, we summarise this chapter in Section 6.6. 
 
6.2  Background and Related Work 
The HTTP protocol document [113] clearly shows that when a client submits an 
HTTP request to a URL, the corresponding server will deliver the HTML text to the 
client, with the HTML text including the references of related objects, e.g. images, 
flashes, etc. The objects will be downloaded to the client one after another, with each 
web page having its own fingerprint. Some web servers may encrypt the content of 
packets. However, an observer can clearly see the packet header, which includes 
sensitive information, such as IP address of the server. 
A number of works have already been completed in regards to traffic analysis. Sun et 
al. [99] tried to identify encrypted network traffic using the HTTP object counts and 
size. Their investigation demonstrated that it was able to identify a significant fraction 
of the World Wide Web sites quite reliably. Following this direction, Wright, 
Monrose and Masson [98] also discovered that website can be identified with a high 
positive probability even in its encrypted channels. Hintz [104] suggested that noise 
should be added to user traffic (also referred to as cover traffic in some papers) to 
users which will change the fingerprints of the server, and transparent pictures should 
be employed to add extra dummy connections against fingerprint attacks. 
Researchers have also explored profiling attacks and proposed solutions. Coull et al. 
[114] evaluated the strength of the anonymisation method in terms of preventing the 
assembly of behavioural profiles. They concluded that anonymisation offers less 
privacy to web browsing traffic than what we expected. Liberatore and Levine [115] 
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used a profiling method to infer the sources of encrypted HTTP connections. They 
applied packet length and direction as attributes, and established a profile database for 
individual encrypted network traffic, and as a result, they knew the source of each 
individual piece of encrypted network traffic. The adversary obtained the features of 
the target network traffic and then compared it with the individual record in the 
profile database, then inferred the possible source of the target traffic. The match 
technique is based on a similarity metric (Jaccard’s coefficient) and a supervised 
learning technique (the naïve Bayesian classifier). The extensive experiments 
demonstrated that the proposed method can identify the source with an accuracy of up 
to 90%. 
Wright, Coull and Monrose [108] recently proposed a traffic morphing method to 
protect the anonymity of communication. They transformed the intended website (e.g. 
www.webmd.com) fingerprint to the fingerprint of another website (e.g. 
www.espn.com). The methods they used included packet padding, and packet 
splitting. They tested their algorithm against the data set offered in Liberatore and 
Levine’s work [115], and found that the proposed method improved the anonymity of 
website access and reduced overhead at the same time. 
Venkitasubramaniam, He and Tong [103] notice the delay caused by adding dummy 
packets into communication channel, and proposed transmission schedules relay 
nodes to maximise network throughput, thus giving the desired level of anonymity. 
Similar to the other works, this research was based on the platform of dummy packet 
padding. 
Web caching and prefetching are effective and efficient solutions for web browsing 
when constrained by bandwidth. Award, Khan and Thuraisingham [112] tried to 
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predict a user’s web surfing path by using a hybrid model, which combines the 
Markov model and Supporting Vector Machine. The fusion of the two models 
complements the weakness of the other and it worked well. Montgomery et al. [116] 
found that the information of a user’s web browsing path offered important 
information for a transaction, and a successful deal usually followed by accessing the 
same path. Teng, Chang and Chen [111] argued that there must be elaborate 
coordination between client side caching and prefetching. They also formulated a 
normalised profit function to evaluate the profit of caching an object, with the 
proposed function integrating a number of factors, such as object size, fetching cost, 
reference rate, invalidation cost, and invalidation frequency. Their event-driven 
simulations demonstrated that the proposed method performed well. 
 
6.3 Problem Statement 
6.3.1 Background of the Problem 
We suppose that an adversary (Bob) is focused on finding which website the 
monitored user (Alice) accesses from a list of possible websites. We suppose Bob has 
the knowledge of all websites on the list, and he is also able to captures all network 
traffics from Alice’s computer. 
In general, every web page is different from the others, such as length of HTML text, 
number of web objects, timing of packet transportation, and number of packets for 
each web object. We use the web fingerprint to represent the uniqueness of a website. 
The web service may be accessed in an encrypted way for a user, such as using SSL. 
However, encryption brings limited changes to the fingerprint. 
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We suppose there are n possible websites that Alice accesses, |, |, |8, … , |}, and 
this is known to Bob. The priori of |21  ^  ~ is denoted as X|21  ^  ~. 
For each website |21  ^  ~, we denote its fingerprint with X2, X2, X28, … , X2. 
For example, for a given website |2, if we count the number of packets for every web 
object, such as HTML text, different images etc., and save them as Y, Y, Y8, … , Y. 
We unify this vector and obtain the distribution as X2, X2, X28, … , X2, where X2N 
YNr∑ YOOP so, 1  a  . Bob monitors Alice’s local network, and makes a number 
of observations 
)  ), ), )8, … 																																																																																																					26 
Based on these observations and the Bayesian Theorem, Bob can claim that Alice 
accesses website |2 with the following probability 
X|2|)  	 X|2 ∙ X)||2X) 																																																																																							27 
On the other hand, the task for defenders is to decrease X|2|) to the minimum by 
anonymisation operations, such as packet padding, and link padding. 
According to Shannon’s perfect secrecy theory [91], an adversary cannot break the 
anonymity if the following equation holds. 
X|2|)  X|2																																																																																																				28 
Namely, observation ) offers no information to the adversary. However, the cost for 
perfect anonymity is extremely expensive by injecting dummy packets according to 
the perfect secrecy theory [91]. 
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6.3.2 Anonymity Measure 
Because of the strict delay constraint of a user’s perception, we cannot always achieve 
perfect anonymity in web browsing. Suppose a user’s perception threshold is ∆ in 
terms of seconds, we can bear this constraint in mind and try our best to improve the 
anonymity of web browsing. In order to measure the degree of anonymity, we create 
the following definition. 
Definition 1: Anonymity level. Let S be the real network traffic for a given session of 
network activity, S may be encrypted or covered. Therefore, the adversary can only 
obtain an observation	) about S. We define a measure for the degree of anonymity as 
follows. 
+  W|)W 																																																																																																														29 
Where H(S) is the entropy [70] of the random variable S, which is defined as follows. 
W  	 
 M X log X∈ 																																																																																30 
where p(s) is the distribution of S and  is the probability space of S. 
W|)	is the conditional entropy [70] of S given ), which is defined as follows. 
W|)  	 
 M X)2W|)  )2∈ 																																																																			31 
where X)2 is the distribution of ) and Γ is the probability space of ). 
Because W|)  	W, we have 0  +  1. Following this definition, we 
obtain	+  1 when W|)  	W holds, namely, S and )	are independent of each 
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other, and the adversary cannot infer any information about S from ), therefore we 
achieve perfect anonymity. If )  , then we have +  0, namely the adversary is 
absolutely sure about session S, and there is no anonymity to him at all. 
Let S be the intended traffic. In order to achieve a given anonymity level +, we need a 
cover for traffic Y. We use function 	 to represent the cost of network traffic X. 
The cost could be bandwidth, delay or number of packets, etc. Therefore, the cost for 
the intended traffic is , and the cost of cover traffic under anonymity level	+	is 
|, +. We define a measure for the cost as follows. 
Definition 2: Anonymity cost coefficient. For a given network traffic S, in order to 
achieve an anonymity level +, we inject cover traffic Y. The anonymity cost 
coefficient is defined as 
  |, + 																																																																																																					32 
We expect 	to be small as possible in practice. 
 
6.4 System Modelling and Analysis 
In this section, we will model the anonymisation system with our definitions and 
compare the proposed strategy against the dummy packet padding schemas based on 
our model. 
6.4.1 System Modelling 
Real applications, situations and accessing patterns can be very complex. In this 
chapter, we focus on the novelty of our anonymisation mechanism and the potential of 
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the proposed strategy. Therefore, we make the following assumptions in order to 
make our explanations clear. 
− We only study cases where the adversary focuses on one target user and 
knows the possible list of websites that the target user accesses. 
− We focus on the anonymity of network traffic sessions, and ignore the link 
padding issue in this chapter. 
− We only discuss the cases of anonymity achieved by packet padding. There is 
no packet splitting in this study, as the cost is the extra delay, rather than 
bandwidth. 
− We only analyse the attack method of packet counting. Our model and strategy 
is also effective for other attack methods, such as packet arrival time intervals. 
− We suppose Alice accesses one website for one session, and she opens the 
default web page (index.html) of the website first, then follows the hyperlinks 
to open other web pages at the website. Our model and strategy can deal with 
other accessing patterns, however we need more time and computing. 
 
 
Figure 44 A packet padding system for anonymous communication. 
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A typical anonymous communication with packet padding is shown in Figure 44. As a 
user, Alice sends an HTTP request to web server |2 through an anonymous channel. 
The web server returns the intended traffic 4  4, 4, 48, … , 4, where 42 represents 
the number of packets of web object i. Let ‖4‖  ∑ 422P 	denote the total number of 
packets of the intended traffic P, and we extract the fingerprint of this session as 
X  X, X, X8, … , X, where X2  42 ‖4‖⁄ , 1  ^  , and ∑ X2  12P . In order to 
make it anonymous to adversaries, we create the cover traffic   , , 8, … ,  
at the server side, where 2  denotes the number of packets that is expected by 42, and 
‖‖  ∑ 22P . Similar to intended traffic P, the fingerprint of Q is  
, , 8, … , . We use ⊕ to represent the anonymisation operations, and  
4 ⊕  is the output of the anonymisation operation on P and Q. The fingerprint of V 
is   , , 8, … , , ∑ 2  12P ,	and ‖‖is the total packet number of V. The 
adversary’s observation ) is the mix of V and other network background traffic. Once 
V arrives at the user’s side, there is a de-anonymisation operation to recover P from V. 
 
In previous work, dummy packets are employed to work as the cover traffic Q. In this 
chapter, we propose to use prefetching web pages as cover traffic, rather than dummy 
packets. Let W be the set of all possible contents of website |2, S be a traffic session 
of accessing |2, and ∆ be the threshold of the maximum cost that users’ can tolerate. 
Then the anonymisation problem can be transformed into an optimisation issue as 
follows: 
Maximise + 
s. t. 
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 ⊕   ∆ 
 ∈  
 ∈  
‖‖  																																																															33 
Where   is the storage capacity of the client, we suppose   ∞ in this chapter. 
In previous dummy packet padding solutions,  ∉  and  ∩   . 
 
6.4.2 System Analysis 
Following the definitions and expressions in the previous section, and in order to 
achieve perfect anonymity, the following equations must hold	    8  ⋯ 
.  
Suppose XO  maxX, X, X8, … , X, then the minimum cover traffic to achieve 
perfect anonymity is given as follows, 
  XO 
 X ∙ ‖4‖, XO 
 X ∙ ‖4‖, XO 
 X8 ∙ ‖4‖, … , XO 
 X ∙ ‖4‖				34 
We have fingerprint of Q as 
  , , 8, … ,   XO 
 X, XO 
 X, XO 
 X8, … , XO 
 X									35 
Then the anonymity cost coefficient in terms of the number of packet is  
  ∑ 22P∑ 422P  ‖‖‖4‖ 																																																																																																			36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In general, given the intended traffic P and an anonymity level +	0  +  1, the 
cost of the cover traffic could be expressed as 
|4, +																																																																																																																37 
For dummy packet padding strategies, the anonymity cost coefficient  could be 
denoted as follows: 
  |4, +4 																																																																																																							38 
In our proposed strategy, the cover traffic is part of P in a long term point of view. 
The extra cost is caused by the data we prefetched but did not use. If we suppose the 
prefetching accuracy is 	0    1, then the extra cost from the cover traffic is as 
follows. 
   4 ∙ 1 
 																																																																																																					39 
Then ¡, the anonymity cost coefficient of our strategy is 
¡   |4, +4  4 ∙ 1 
 |4, +4 																																																										40 
If   0, then ¡  , namely the anonymity cost coefficient of our strategy is the 
same as the others. On the other hand, if   0, then ‖‖  0, we have ¡  0. In 
other words, there is no wastage of resources at all. In general, for 0    1, if the 
cost function ∙ is a linear function, then we can simplify ¡ as follows. 
¡  1 
  ∙ +																																																																																																			41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6.5 Performance Evaluation 
In order to show the potentials of the proposed strategy, we extract the relationship 
between the anonymity level and the cost against the real data set used in [115]. The 
same data set was also used in [108] to indicate the cost efficiency of their morphing 
strategy. 
The data set included the tcpdump files of 2000 websites from February 10, 2006 to 
April 28, 2006, which are sorted by popularity from Site0 to Site1999 from the most 
to the least. There are a few different sessions everyday for each website and, for each 
session users may access different web pages in the same day. We take Site0, Site500, 
and Site1999 as three representatives from the dataset. For a given network session, 
we use the number of packets for web objects as fingerprints. For the same website, 
user may access different web pages, therefore, the fingerprint for each session is only 
a part of the entire fingerprint. The fingerprints of the aforementioned 6 sessions are 
shown in Figure 45. 
In the case of perfect anonymity, the number of packets for every web object was the 
same since we added cover traffic to the intended traffic. In order to obtain a different 
level of anonymity, we partially started the perfect anonymity operation, and pad the 
related cover traffic to the intended traffic, one web object at a time, starting from the 
first web object to the last. This is a simple way for anonymisation with + ≺ 1. The 
result of the anonymity level against the progress of anonymisation is shown in Figure 
46. The results show that + approaches 1 when we process increasing numbers of web 
objects. This indicates that a higher anonymity level requires more cover traffic, and 
this matches our analysis in the previous sections. 
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Figure 45 Fingerprints of network sessions 
 
 
Figure 46 Anonymity level against anonymisation progress on web objects 
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In order to show the direct relationship between anonymity level and the anonymity 
cost coefficient, we carefully extracted this information from the 6 network sessions. 
The results are presented in Figure 47 as follows. 
 
 
Figure 47 Anonymity cost coefficient (ACC) against anonymity level 
 
From Figure 47, we find that the cost for perfect anonymity is extremely expensive. 
For example, the volume of cover traffic for Site1999-2 is more than 120 times that of 
the intended traffic and is more than 10 times for a simple website, such as Site500, 
which has a small number of packets as indicated in Figure 45. These preliminary 
experiments showed the huge potential for saving resources from our proposed 
strategy. Moreover, the experiments on Site0 in Figure 47 show an anomaly at the 
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beginning where more cover traffic results in a lower anonymity level. We are 
extremely interested to investigate this in our future research. 
 
6.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
We noticed that the cost of dummy packet padding is very expensive for anonymous 
web browsing. Therefore, a novel strategy is proposed to significantly reduce the cost 
for web browsing – take web prefetched data as cover traffic instead of dummy 
packets. Moreover, it is hard to achieve perfect anonymity in some cases of web 
browsing and therefore, we defined a measure (anonymity level) to be a metric for 
measuring user requirements of anonymity. We modelled the anonymous system in a 
theoretical way, and described the relationship between the anonymity level and the 
cost in theory. Furthermore, we transformed the anonymity problem into an 
optimisation problem, and this transformation brought numerous possible solutions 
from the optimisation field. We believe that this model offers a solid platform for 
further research.  
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CHAPTER 7   
Enhanced Web Privacy Protection: Anonymous Web 
Browsing through Predicted Pages 
Anonymous web browsing is an emerging topic of interest with many potential 
applications for privacy and security. However, most of the related research focuses 
heavily on latency anonymous communications. The research on light latency 
anonymous communication, such as web browsing, is quite limited. One reason for 
this is the huge delay caused by the current dominant dummy packet padding strategy. 
As a result, it is hard to achieve perfect anonymity for web browsing applications. We 
have proposed the use of prefetched web pages as cover traffic to obtain perfect 
anonymity in web browsing. Based on Shannon’s perfect secrecy theory, we formally 
establish a mathematical model for the problem, and define a metric to measure the 
cost of achieving perfect anonymity. The experiments on the real-trace dataset 
demonstrated that the proposed strategy can reduce the delay ten times compared to 
the dummy packet padding methods. This fact alone confirms the vast potential for 
our proposed strategy. 
 
7.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to present a novel strategy to achieve perfect anonymity 
in web browsing. Anonymous web browsing is demanded by Internet users for 
privacy and security reasons, yet web browsing with perfect anonymity has rarely 
been achieved using traditional methods, such as packet padding. According to the 
recent ACM survey [109], anonymous communication systems can often be classified 
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into two general categories: high-latency systems and low-latency systems. High-
latency anonymity systems are able to provide strong anonymity, but are typically 
only applicable for non-interactive applications that can tolerate delays of several 
hours or more, such as mix networks [88] for email messages. On the other hand, low-
latency anonymity systems often provide better performance and are intended for real-
time applications, particularly web browsing. The examples for this category are the 
Tor system [46] and, the Crowds system [89]. Because of the strict time constraints, a 
significant challenge is posed in creating perfect anonymity in low-latency systems, 
such as web browsing. The general goal of attacks on anonymous communication is 
to identify pair wise entities in the systems, rather than the content of the 
communication, which is usually encrypted. For example, does user A communicate 
with user C? Does user D access website E?  
Data encryption is usually used to provide security. However, data encryption for 
anonymous web browsing is vulnerable to traffic analysis. In general, every web page 
is different, and differences may include length of HTML text, number of web 
objects, number of packets for each web object, or timing information of packet 
transportation. Each website has its own distinctive features which are a combination 
of all features of its web pages. In this chapter, we use fingerprints to represent the 
uniqueness of a web page. A website may be accessed in an encrypted way, such as 
using SSL, however, encryption brings limited changes to the fingerprint [99]. As a 
result, attackers usually use traffic analysis techniques to break the anonymity in 
communication [92, 93]. 
Packet padding techniques are normally employed on top of data encryption to protect 
anonymity during web browsing. Perfect anonymity in communication means that 
anonymity cannot be breached in any situation. According to Shannon’s perfect 
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secrecy theory [91], perfect anonymity in communication is possible. Researchers 
currently employ packet padding techniques to disguise fingerprints in 
communication. For example, hiding fingerprints for traffic sessions [103, 104]. 
Moreover, in order to hide the timing information of connections, link padding is 
employed [106]. Currently, the dominant strategy of packet padding is using dummy 
packets as cover traffic. This strategy results in two major problems for 
communication: huge delay and extra bandwidth demand. Because of the strict delay 
constraints from web viewers, it is almost impossible to achieve perfect anonymity in 
web browsing using the dummy packet padding strategy. 
In this chapter, we propose a novel approach to address the aforementioned problem, 
which is an extension of our previous work [117] as detailed in Chapter 6. In our 
previous work, we have shown the great potential for obtaining anonymity of web 
browsing using prefetched data and in this chapter we explore further aspects. Our 
proposal comes from the fact that users generally access a number of web pages from 
one website according to their own habits or interests. This has been confirmed by 
applications of web caching and web page prefetching technologies [111, 112]. 
Therefore, we can use prefetched data to replace dummy packets for padding. We 
propose to disguise the fingerprints of web sites at the server side by injecting 
predicted web pages that users download as cover traffic, rather than using dummy 
packets as cover traffic. From a long term point of view, this novel strategy wastes 
limited bandwidth and causes limited delay. 
The contributions of this chapter are listed as follows. 
− We propose to use predicted web pages to conduct packet padding for web 
browsing, instead of using dummy packets. This fundamentally addresses the 
problems of extra delay and extra bandwidth demand which is an issue for 
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traditional dummy packet padding methods. Based on our knowledge, this 
chapter proposes a brand new strategy for anonymous web browsing. 
− We establish a simple mathematical model based on the perfect secrecy theory 
for the proposed strategy and define a metric to measure the cost of web 
browsing with perfect anonymity. 
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 introduces related work. 
We present the setting of the problem in Section 7.3, followed by the system 
modelling and analysis in Section 7.4. The preliminary performance evaluations are 
conducted in Section 7.5. Finally, Section 7.6 summarises the chapter. 
 
7.2 Background and Related Work 
The HTTP protocol document [113] shows that when a client submits an HTTP 
request to a URL, the corresponding server will deliver the HTML text to the client, 
with the HTML text including the references of the related objects such as images and 
flashes. The objects will be downloaded to the client one after the other. Therefore, 
each web page has its own fingerprint in terms of the number of web objects, packet 
arrival time intervals, and so on. Some web servers may encrypt the content of 
packets, however, the fingerprint cannot be disguised by the encryption against traffic 
analysis. 
A number of works have been completed in terms of traffic analysis. Sun et al. [99] 
tried to identify encrypted network traffic using the HTTP object number and size. 
Their investigation showed that it was sufficient to reliably identify a significant 
fraction of World Wide Web sites. Following this direction, Wright, Monrose and 
  
143 
 
Masson [98] further confirmed that websites can be identified with high probability 
even if it is an encrypted channel. Hintz [104] suggested that noise should be added to 
traffic (also referred to as cover traffic in some papers) which will change the 
fingerprints of the server, and transparent pictures should be employed to increase the 
dummy connections and counter fingerprint attacks. 
Researchers also explored profiling attacks and proposed solutions. Timing attacks 
[100, 101] based on the fact that low-latency anonymous systems, such as onion 
routing, do not introduce any delays or significant changes to the timing patterns of an 
anonymous connection. The time intervals of the arrival packets of HTML texts and 
HTTP objects are usually similar for the target user and the adversary. If they access 
the same web page, then it is easier for the adversary to figure out which website the 
target user accessed from the list. Coull et al. [114] evaluated the strength of the 
anonymisation method in terms of preventing the assembly of behavioural profiles, 
and concluded that anonymisation offers less privacy to web browsing traffic than 
what we expected. Liberatore and Levine [115] used a profiling method to infer the 
sources of encrypted HTTP connections. They applied packet length and direction as 
attributes, and established a profile database for individual encrypted network traffic. 
Based on this information, they can infer the source of individual encrypted network 
traffic. The match technique is based on a similarity metric (Jaccard’s coefficient) and 
a supervised learning technique (the naive Bayesian classifier). Their extensive 
experiments showed that the proposed method can identify the source with an 
accuracy of up to 90%. 
Wright, Coull and Monrose [108] recently proposed a traffic morphing method to 
protect the anonymity of communication. They transformed the intended website (e.g. 
www.webmd.com) fingerprint to the fingerprint of another web site (e.g. 
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www.espn.com). The transformation methods they took include packet padding and 
packet splitting. Optimal techniques were employed to find the best cover website (in 
terms of minimum cost for transformation) from a list. They tested their algorithm 
against the dataset offered in Liberatore and Levine’s work [115], and found that the 
proposed method can improve the anonymity of accessing web site and reducing 
overheads at the same time. Venkitasubramaniam, He and Tong [103] noticed the 
delay caused by adding dummy packets into communication channels, and proposed 
transmission schedules on relay nodes to maximise network throughput given a 
desired level of anonymity. Similar to other work, this is also based on the platform of 
dummy packet padding. 
Web caching and prefetching are also effective and efficient solutions for web 
browsing when bandwidth is a constraint. Award, Khan and Thuraisingham [112] 
tried to predict paths of web surfers using a hybrid model, which combines the 
Markov model and the Supporting Vector Machine. The fusion of the two models 
complements the weakness of the other and they work together well. Montgomery et 
al. [116] found that the information from a user’s web browsing path offers important 
information for a transaction, with a successful deal usually followed by a number of 
similar accessing path. Teng, Chang and Chen [111] argued that there must be an 
elaborate coordination between client side caching and prefetching, with formulation 
of a normalised profit function to evaluate the profit from caching an object. The 
proposed function integrated a number of factors, such as object size, fetching cost, 
reference rate, invalidation cost, and invalidation frequency. Their event-driven 
simulations showed that the proposed method performed well. 
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7.3 Problem Statement 
Alice accesses web sites via encrypted channels, and an adversary (Bob) focuses on 
identifying which website Alice chooses from a list of possible websites. We suppose 
Bob has knowledge of all the websites on the list. Bob also captures all network 
traffic from Alice’s computer. We assume there are n possible websites that Alice 
accesses, |, |, |8, … , |}. The priori of |21  ^  ~ is denoted as X|21 
^  ~. For each website |21  ^  ~, we denote its fingerprint with 
X2, X2, X28, … , X2. For example, for a given website |2, we count the number of 
packets for every web object, such as HTML text, different images etc., and save 
them as Y, Y, Y8, … , Y. We unify this vector and make the distribution as 
X2, X2, X28, … , X2, where X2N  YNr∑ YOOP so, 1  a  . Bob monitors Alice’s 
local network, and obtains a number of observations 
)  ), ), )8, … 																																																																																																					42 
Based on these observations and Bayesian Theorem, Bob can claim that Alice 
accesses website |2 with the following probability. 
X|2|)  	 X|2 ∙ X)||2X) 																																																																																							43 
where X|2, X)||2 and X) are known to Bob, because Bob can actually access 
the n websites individually to obtain this information. 
On the other hand, the task for Alice is to decrease X|2|) to the minimum. As we 
know that data encryption itself cannot achieve the goal of anonymity, Alice has to 
employ further anonymisation operations, such as packet padding and link padding to 
fight against Bob. 
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According to Shannon’s perfect secrecy theory [91], an adversary cannot break the 
anonymity if the following equation holds. 
X|2|)  X|2																																																																																																			44 
Namely, the observation offers no information to the adversary. However, the cost for 
perfect anonymity is extremely expensive by injecting dummy packets according to 
the perfect secrecy theory. In order to measure the cost for perfect anonymity, we 
define the following: 
Definition: Cost Coefficient of Anonymity. Let function  represents the cost 
function for a given network traffic S. For given intended network traffic X, we inject 
cover traffic Y to achieve the goal of anonymity, then the cost coefficient of 
anonymity is defined as 
  |	 w 		 																																																																																													45 
This metric will be used to indicate the cost efficiency for perfect anonymity 
operations in this chapter. 
 
7.4 System Modelling and Analysis 
In real applications, accessing patterns can be very complex. However, in this chapter, 
we focus on presenting the effectiveness of our proposed strategy as a new 
anonymisation method, and demonstrate the great potential for our proposed strategy. 
Therefore, we confined our research space with the following conditions: 
− We focus on perfect anonymity of network traffic sessions and ignored the 
link padding issue. 
− We only discuss cases for achieving anonymity by packet padding and exclude 
the packet splitting operations. 
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− We use the number of packets for web page objects as the fingerprint and 
focus on this kind of attacks in this context. We do not discuss timing traffic 
analysis attacks in this chapter. 
 
 
Figure 48 A packet padding system for anonymous web browsing 
 
A typical anonymous web browsing system with data encryption (at the Internet 
channels) and packet padding (at the server side) is shown in Figure 48. As a client, 
Alice sends a HTTP request to web server |2  via an encrypted channel. The web 
server also employs an encrypted channel to return the intended traffic 	 
Y, Y, Y8, … , Y, where Y21  ^   represents the number of packets for web 
object i. Let ‖	‖  ∑ Y22P 	denote the total number of packets for the intended traffic 
X. We then extract the fingerprint of this session as X  X, X, X8, … , X where 
X2  Y2 ‖	‖⁄ , 1  ^  , and ∑ X2  12P . In order to make it anonymous to 
adversaries, we create cover traffic   £, £, £8, … , £ at the server side. Let 
£21  ^   denotes the number of packets assigned to cover Y2, and let ‖‖ 
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∑ £22P . Similar to intended traffic X, the fingerprint of Y is   , , 8, … , . If 
¤  ¥, ¥, ¥8, … , ¥ represents the mixture of intended traffic X and cover traffic Y, 
then the fingerprint of Z is d  d, d, d8, … , d, and the total number of mixed traffic 
is ‖¤‖. The adversary’s observation ) is the mixture of Z and other background traffic 
on the network. 
In the previous chapter, dummy packets were employed to work as cover traffic Y. 
Once Z arrives at the client side, dummy packet Y will be discarded. Another solution 
is to use transparent images as cover traffic. However, in the proposed strategy, the 
predicted web data is used as cover traffic Y, with the client decomposing the received 
traffic, intended traffic X goes to the web browser, prefetched data Y is stored in the 
cache of the local computer, and Y may be used by the following requests. In this 
case, the client will fetch the expected web data from the cache rather than 
downloading it again from the server. From a long term point of view, the bandwidth 
is not wasted and the average extra delay is limited in the proposed scheme. 
In order to achieve perfect anonymity as described by Shannon [91], the following 
equation must hold. 
d  d  d8  ⋯  d																																																																																												46 
Furthermore, the following condition must also hold. 
¥  ¥  ¥8  ⋯  ¥																																																																																											47 
This means that every traffic session is the same. As a result, Bob cannot obtain any 
information from his observation. 
Let YO¦§  maxY, Y, Y8, … , Y, with the minimum cover traffic to achieve perfect 
anonymity given as follows. 
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K
£  YO¦§ 
 	 Y£  YO¦§ 
 	 Y£8  YO¦§ 
 	 Y8⋮£  YO¦§ 
 	 Y
							
©ª«
ª¬																																																																																												48 
Let the cost function ∙ be the number of packets, with the cost coefficient for 
anonymity expressed as follows. 
  ‖¤‖‖	‖  ∑ Y2 w £22P∑ Y22P 																																																																																					49 
Let   represent the cost coefficient for perfect anonymity using the dummy packet 
padding strategy, then 
 	  ‖¤‖‖	‖   ∙ YO¦§∑ Y22P 																																																																																											50 
On the other hand, with the proposed strategy, the cover traffic is part of X in the long 
term. The extra cost for the proposed mechanism is part of the cover traffic prefetched 
by the client but never accessed. We define the missing rate as the ratio of the hitless 
prefetched data and the total prefetched data. Let 	0    1 be the missing rate in 
the local cache, then the cost coefficient of perfect anonymity of the proposed strategy 
¡ is 
¡ 	   ∙ ‖‖ w ‖	‖‖	‖  ∑  ∙ YO¦§ 
 Y22P ∑ Y22P w 1																																							51 
Comparing Equation 50 and Equation 51, we reach the following conclusion. 
¡  	,					0    1																																																																																			52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The worst case of the proposed strategy is when   1 (all prefetched data is unused 
in the future), ¡    holds. In other words, our strategy is no worse than dummy 
packet padding approaches. 
 
7.5 Performance Evaluation 
In order to confirm the advantages of the proposed strategy, we conducted two 
preliminary experiments using a real world data set [118], which is widely used by the 
community, such as in [108] and [115]. The dataset includes the tcpdump files of 
2000 websites from February 10, 2006 to April 28, 2006. These have been sorted by 
popularity with all data encrypted. We took 30 continuous days from the most popular 
web site as the data set for the experiments in this chapter, and treated each day as one 
session. We extracted the fingerprint (number of TCP packets for each web page 
object) of every session for the 30 days. 
We first investigated the cost coefficient of perfect anonymity for the proposed 
strategy with different missing rate (namely, different prefetching accuracy). The 
results are shown in Figure 49. 
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Figure 49 : Cost coefficient of perfect anonymity versus sessions with different missing rate 
 
We can see that when there is nothing missing (  0), the cost coefficient for perfect 
anonymity achieves the minimum, 1, which is the ideal for users. When the missing 
rate is 0.5 (  0.5), the mean of the cost coefficient for perfect anonymity is around 
7.59. Furthermore, the mean of the cost coefficient for perfect anonymity is 14.35 
when all prefetched data is missing (  1, equal the case of dummy packet padding 
strategy), with this variation depending on the fingerprint distribution of web pages. 
This preliminary experiment indicates that the cost for perfect anonymity using the 
dummy packet padding strategy is much higher (around 15 times more traffic volume 
and consequently, a 15 fold increase in delays) than using the proposed strategy. In 
other words, our strategy can reduce the delay up to 15 times compared to the dummy 
packet padding method. 
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Figure 50 Cost coefficient of perfect anonymity against length of session per day for the 
dummy packet padding strategy 
 
We are also interested in the relationship between the cost coefficients of perfect 
anonymity against the length of a session. We took 4 random samples from the data 
set over the 30 days period. We calculated the cost coefficient of perfect anonymity 
for the dummy packet padding strategy against the length of each session (we 
increased the length of sessions in the experiment). The results are shown in Figure 
50. The cost coefficient of perfect anonymity for the dummy packet padding strategy 
was an increase in function against the length of each session. Every change point 
indicated bigger objects in terms of packet number in the past, namely, the change 
point depended on the distribution of larger objects. In other words, the longer the 
session length was, the higher the cost for the dummy packet padding method in order 
to achieve perfect anonymity. However, this was not a problem for our proposed 
strategy. 
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7.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, we propose a novel strategy to achieve perfect anonymity in web 
browsing by using prefetched data as cover traffic, rather than using dummy packets 
as cover traffic. The proposed strategy made web browsing with perfect anonymity 
much easier to achieve for Internet users, which was extremely hard to accomplish 
using the traditional dummy packet padding strategy. We established a mathematical 
model for the problem based on Shannon’s perfect secrecy theory, and our analysis 
demonstrated that the proposed strategy was always equal to or better than the dummy 
packet padding strategy in terms of delay. Furthermore, we revealed the huge 
advantages of the proposed method in this chapter. The preliminary experiments 
confirmed our theoretical analysis, and demonstrated that the proposed strategy 
outperforms the traditional dummy packet padding method approximately 15 times in 
terms of delay and bandwidth cost.  
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CHAPTER 8  
Conclusion and Future Works 
8.1  Methodology and Thesis Overview 
This thesis has covered a range of algorithms that help to improve the security of web 
services. We have focused on the problems of DDoS attack and traffic analysis attack 
against service availability and information privacy respectively. 
In DDoS attacks, attackers can set up different types of attack sources and then 
implement various packet-transmission strategies and various packet forms to disrupt 
the available services of their victims. Consequently, DDoS defence systems need to 
deploy variety of DDoS detection methods in order to mitigate the damage from the 
attacks. This can be slow depending on computational processes and they may be 
unable to serve mitigation purpose in real-time. 
In particular circumstances, it is difficult to discriminate between DDoS attacks and 
flash crowds. Flash crowds are described as the sudden surge of legitimate network 
traffic which comes from legitimate users of available services. Since DDoS attacks 
can be crafted to look like a flash crowd, the existing DDoS detection systems can be 
fooled into letting the flash-crowd attack pass through to the victim(s). Moreover, 
false detection results can be very risky to available services. In the case of false 
positives, if the detection system treats the legitimate flash crowds as DDoS attacks, 
legitimate users are unable to access the available service, which accelerates the DoS 
condition to services. In the case of false negatives, if the detection system treats the 
DDoS attack as a high volume of legitimate traffic, then the available services receive 
undesired traffic as the result of a successful DDoS attacks. 
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Existing DDoS detection systems lack autonomous learning ability to adjust their 
detection results. Most detection methods deploy statistical and heuristic approaches 
to measure the differences between DDoS attacks and legitimate traffics. While, the 
key to any statistical-based detection system (SBDS) is its ability to learn and 
distinguish normal from anomalous network activity, the heuristic-based system 
(HBDS) relies on optimisation of its threshold decision and requires fine-tuning to 
produce stability, improvement, or precise results of anomaly detection in network 
traffic to minimise the false positives/negatives. However, these detection methods 
need to be manually adjusted in order to fine-tune the results. 
A major threat to information privacy on web services is traffic analysis attacks. Users 
of a web service have the right to protect their confidential information from falling 
into the hands of a third party. Failure to provide information privacy on a web 
service may result in an undesirable outcome. The aim of traffic analysis attacks is to 
obtain the content of communications. Adversaries who use traffic analysis attacks 
usually focus on discovering whether two entities communicate with each other. 
Moreover, it is a significant challenge to achieve perfect anonymity for web browsing 
applications. The research on light latency anonymous communication, such as web 
browsing, is quite limited because of the huge delays and high processing costs 
caused by the current dominant dummy packet padding strategy. 
 
8.2 Thesis Contribution 
The major contribution of this thesis is the development of a set of methods to 
overcome the problems outlined above. Each method consists of a set of algorithms 
which have been tested by several sample datasets. We have summarised these 
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contributions based on the research areas of DDoS attacks detection and web access 
anonymity. 
Chapter 3 proposed DDoS attacks detection by discriminating DDoS attacks from 
legitimate flash crowds. We performed a similarity measurement of suspicious traffic 
flows which could be classified as either a DDoS attack flow or flash crowd. We 
proposed the Jeffrey distance, the Sibson distance, and the Hellinger distance as 
measurement tools in order to achieve our goal. The main contributions of Chapter 3 
are as follows: 
− From our simulations, the Sibson distance is the best measurement tools 
compared to the other two distance metrics for our DDoS discrimination 
purpose. This is because the Sibson distance is the least sensitive and the most 
stable metric among the previously mentioned metrics. 
− The proposed discrimination method is scalable and practical. The detection 
method required only two cooperative routers and it can implement 
cooperating detection in any routers on the Internet, rather than limiting it to 
only within an ISP network or a community network. This would make it 
much easier to achieve early detection of a DDoS attack well before it reaches 
the targeted victim. 
− The proposed detection method is not dependent upon any specific type of 
DDoS attack sources. Therefore, this method can detect any forthcoming 
easily. 
− The proposed detection method was used on real-trace datasets. It proved that 
it was able to differentiate DDoS flooding attacks from flash crowds with a 
high rate of accuracy. 
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Chapter 4 proposed DDoS detection that can discriminate DDoS attacks from 
legitimate flash crowds. We focused on examining the individual source of suspicious 
traffic flows using data dependency as a measurement tool. We proposed a set of 
attack signatures detected by suspicious behaviours such as a repeatable feature of 
arrival rates from DDoS attack traffic. By using Pearson’s correlation coefficient as a 
dependency measurement, we matched the signature on DDoS attacks and 
discriminated them from flash crowds. The overall contributions of this chapter are as 
follows: 
− The proposed detection methods can detect DDoS attacks with a high rate of 
accuracy. We measured the data dependency of DDoS attack flows and 
compared this to flash crowds. The results of our experiments showed low 
false positives and false negatives. 
− The detection methods can be implemented in real-world cases based on 
current Internet technology. With light calculation and low complexity, the 
proposed methods can feasibly be implemented on many kinds of network 
equipment such as hubs/switches, firewalls, routers and IDS. 
− The detection methods were able to detect DDoS attacks in real-time. With a 
short period of detection time, the methods benefit the defence system by 
responding to an action. This could support early DDoS detection before the 
suspicious flash-crowd traffic arrives at the server. 
− The detection methods are independent of methods for attack packet 
transmission and types of attack packets. We detect repeatable features of 
packets transmission as DDoS signatures. Hence, the detection methods may 
be able to handle any form of attack packets such as malformed IP, TCP, 
UDP, ICMP, or Application-based floods, etc. 
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Chapter 5 proposed an improved method for DDoS attacks detection. We measure the 
data dependency and predictability of suspicious traffics by using Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient and Shannon entropy respectively. The results of these 
measurements were then transferred to the process of Linear Discriminant Analysis 
(LDA). Based on previous knowledge of known groups, LDA can discriminate 
legitimate flash crowds from DDoS attack traffics with a high rate of accuracy. The 
contributions of this chapter are as follows: 
− The proposed DDoS detection system gave us a high rate of accuracy in 
detection results. By using the triple checks from Pearson’s correlation, 
Shannon’s entropy and LDA, the statistical relationship of a traffic flow was 
measured intensively. The detection system maximised the accuracy in 
detection and minimised the false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate 
(FNR) in the results. 
− The proposed DDoS detection system was flexible and extensible in 
implementation. With light calculation and low complexity, the proposed 
method can be implemented on many kinds of network equipments such as 
hubs/switches, firewalls, routers, IDS and IPS. We can distribute the 
coordinate detection to participating network equipments in order to extend 
the secured border. 
− This method is developing for the purposes of supporting early DDoS 
detection. The detection system may be able implement in any part of the 
network route from the packet source to the server. This feature supports the 
implementation of cooperative security networks. As soon as suspicious flash-
crowd traffic arrives at the detection sensors, we can raise the alarm to alert 
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the server in the early stages. This helps the service provider prepare for the 
proper action to curb the suspicious traffic flows. 
− The DDoS detection system is independent from packet forms and 
transmission strategies. This system can support the examination of any form 
of attack packets such as malformed IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, or Application-
based floods, etc. It also works well with low-rate attacks, flash-crowd attacks, 
shrew attacks, periodical attacks, and pulsing attacks. 
− We proposed the learning ability of our DDoS detection system. The 
classification module allows the detection system to adjust its knowledge. 
Since the decision making module provides the double checks for the accuracy 
of results, the knowledge from feedback can be reused by the training 
algorithm. Hence, the knowledge is optimised and the accuracy is maximised. 
Chapter 6 propose a novel strategy to improve information privacy on web-based 
services. We can achieve perfect anonymity based on Shannon’s perfect secrecy 
theory by covering the original traffic with packet padding. In our proposed methods, 
we replace the dummy packet strategy using prefetched web pages for padding traffic 
in order to minimise the cost. We also transformed the anonymity problem into an 
optimisation trade-off between the anonymity level and the cost of cover traffics. The 
principal contributions of this chapter are as follows: 
− Our novel strategy for packet padding using prefetched data as cover traffic 
for anonymous web browsing. The proposed strategy allows for the highest 
level of anonymity in web browsing under low latency network conditions to 
be reached as well as the reduction of bandwidth wastage and network delays 
significantly. 
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− A mathematical model has been established to describe and analyse the 
anonymisation systems. We believe this model can be deployed for further 
research in the security area. 
− We transformed the anonymous communication problem into an optimisation 
problem based on our model. As a result, we can solve trade-off between the 
anonymity level and the cost of applications. This allows users to deploy the 
proper anonymity level once the delay constraint is known. 
Chapter 7 proposed a novel strategy to improve perfect anonymity in web browsing. 
We formally established a mathematical model based on Shannon’s perfect secrecy 
theory for solving the problem of high traffic cost. We also defined a metric to 
measure the cost of the prefetched data as cover traffic using our method. The main 
contributions of this chapter are listed as follows. 
− We proposed a new strategy for anonymous web browsing which deploys 
predicted web pages to conduct packet padding for web browsing, instead of 
dummy packets. 
− We established a simple mathematical model based on the perfect secrecy 
theory for the proposed strategy and defined a metric to measure the cost of 
web browsing with perfect anonymity. 
− Our strategy was proven to essentially reduce the problems of extra delay and 
demand for extra bandwidth using the traditional dummy packet padding 
methods. 
 
8.3 Future Directions 
Security on availability and information privacy of web services is an urgent global 
issue. The vision of this thesis was to develop and improve defence systems, models 
  
161 
 
and architectures against DDoS attack and traffic analysis attack. These attacks are 
actively for searching for new approaches against defence mechanisms and systems. 
The following are areas that could be improved and extended in future research. 
− The perfect accuracy in DDoS detection is far from a reality. Leaning the truth 
and the fact of data is the key to minimising false detection. We can also 
improve the accuracy of the flow based discrimination strategy with more side 
information, such as other independent attack features, and extending the 
experiments on a large scale to observe the performance of the discrimination 
algorithm. In addition, we are also looking forward to improving the accuracy 
of discrimination with double checks being used in the decision making 
module as described in chapter 5. This could provide us with more accuracy 
however we may not implement this additional module in real-time detection. 
− A large number of observing data may cause delay in DDoS detection. This 
delay increases the chance of the victim to crash due to a large number of 
incoming packets. The problem was that we used the time slot for observing 
sample data. Thus, we rely on the time domain rather than the number of 
packets. Therefore, we need to improve our proposed methods for detecting 
the repeatable features of other packet information such as packet delay. 
− The detection time is so much more important for the DDoS defence system. 
If the processes of DDoS detection take too long, the stream packets may be 
delayed at the defence system. This means the legitimated clients may be 
waiting for a period of time for a response messages. 
− We need to explore our methods with some challenges, such as DDoS attacks 
with spoofing IP address. In chapter 4 and 5, our methods use an individual 
check for the IP address of a possible attack source. IP spoofing may confuse 
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our detection system by creating many random IP addresses. Instead of 
observing behaviour from regular clients, we may confront a number of 
strange new clients. Therefore, through observation of the changing rate of a 
port number, a possible solution could be provided for us. 
− Extracting the repeatable feature of attack source is not an easy job as 
complexity is an issue that may cause other problems such as delay and 
implementation. If the detection mechanism is very complicated, the system 
may be delayed to achieve a result. On the other hand, the simple method 
cannot describe the attack phenomenon very well. Finding the balance 
between delay and complexity is one of the challenges in DDoS detection. 
− The DDoS detection system should be able to achieve easy implementation 
and use. To employ a DDoS defence system in an organisation, it must have a 
high probability of success. Otherwise, it becomes unnecessarily expensive 
technology. In addition, our DDoS detection models are not too complex at 
this stage. However, to cover various methods of DDoS attack, we need to 
improve the complexity, but not too much that makes implementation 
difficult. We believe that we can insert complexity in some cases of DDoS 
attack to achieve accurate results. 
− We believe our methods could be implemented on any network equipment 
such as switches, routers, firewalls, IDS, and so forth. This increases the 
chance of detecting the DDoS attack at an earlier stage before reaching the 
victim. 
− In Chapter 5, the full learning algorithm must be improved based on the 
feedback from measurement and making decision modules. This gives us a 
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smart DDoS detection system with its AI having the capacity to improve its 
accuracy and configuration process by itself. 
− In Chapter 5, we expect to extend the model to multiple user scenarios, and 
include link padding with multiple uses. Web prefetching algorithms will be 
integrated into the model, and extensive tests against the data set are expected 
in the near future. More effort is desired in the process of de-anonymisation at 
the client side for efficiency and accuracy. 
− In real applications on the Internet, it is extraordinarily expensive to achieve 
perfect anonymity, therefore, alternative solutions are desperately needed. 
Packet dropping is an interesting strategy to optimise and reduce cost. 
− Relative anonymisation is an interesting method to improve web access 
anonymity. In some cases, perfect anonymity may not be necessary, as users 
only expect some level of anonymity for their web browsing. Moreover, the 
adversary may not have complete observation of the monitored users, and 
therefore, an adaptive method may be introduced to further reduce the cost of 
anonymisation. We believe Game Theory can play a great role in this 
direction, for example, finding the boundaries of anonymisation cost against a 
given anonymity level. 
− Link padding has to be considered in the framework, which will reduce the 
cost significantly. It also poses a great challenge for achieving anonymity of 
web browsing. 
− The trade-off between defence mechanisms of a DDoS attack and traffic 
analysis needs to be negotiated. Since we improved web access anonymity 
against traffic analysis attack, the encrypted HTTP communication traffic has 
also been covered. Perfect anonymity will secure the privacy of user 
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information from traffic analysis attacks, but this fails to apply for DDoS 
attack detection. This is because DDoS detection also requires the 
performance of traffic analysis such as observation of the pattern of traffic 
requests. We therefore need to establish a scheme of negotiation that allows 
the traffic analysis performed to detect DDoS attack.  
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